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DEAR COLLEAGUE: TITLE IX COORDINATORS AND 
INCONSISTENT COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAWS 
GOVERNING CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 
Brian A. Pappas* 
ABSTRACT 
Title IX Coordinators are tasked with effectuating Title IX compliance to ensure a 
safe campus while protecting the rights of survivors and alleged perpetrators. An epidemic 
of university sexual misconduct and widespread non-reporting provided the context for a 
2011 Department of Education Office of Civil Rights Dear Colleague Letter redefining 
compliance. This article utilizes interviews conducted between 2011 and 2014 with 13 
Title IX Coordinators from large institutions of higher education to provide a ground-level 
view of compliance in action. In the very best light, during this time university compliance 
with Title IX was highly inconsistent and largely ineffective. Title IX Coordinators depart 
from the archetype in order to create substantive justice for individuals in a framework 
they view as overly formalistic. They also depart to establish professional worth, to avoid 
negative publicity, and to effectuate managerial solutions that symbolize compliance. The 
results are Title IX processes that are less than consistent, reliable, and impartial, vali-
dating calls for increased procedural protections for victims and alleged perpetrators. 
Overall, the picture of university Title IX compliance is one motivated more by symbolic 
enforcement than true dedication to ensure a hostility-free campus. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sexual misconduct is an ongoing problem on university campuses, and universities 
are struggling to develop procedures to address it. There is an epidemic of peer sexual 
violence (one student sexually harassing another in a manner that includes physical con-
duct) occurring on campuses across the nation. For example, a survey of over 5,000 un-
dergraduate women and over 1,000 undergraduate men at two large public universities 
found that 13.7 percent of undergraduate women reported at least one completed sexual 
assault since entering college and 6.1 percent of undergraduate men reported experiencing 
attempted or completed sexual assaults.1 In this article, I will refer to the accused as the 
                                                          
* Brian A. Pappas, Ph.D., LL.M., J.D., M.P.P., Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Associate Director of Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution, and Title IX Coordinator at Michigan State University College of Law. The author 
gratefully acknowledges the able research assistance of Lorena Valencia and the helpful comments of MSU Law 
Faculty at a Faculty Scholarship Presentation in 2015. As my 2015 dissertation forms the basis for this article, a 
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“alleged perpetrators” and those who have experienced sexual assault as “survivors.”2 
Drugs and alcohol surely contribute to many of these assaults, accentuating the problem 
as so many college students drink to excess.3 
Universities were clearly put on notice about these problems, if they had not been 
before, by a “Dear Colleague” letter issued by the U.S. Department of Education in 2011 
that required universities to take steps to address the problem or risk loss of federal fund-
ing.4 Complaints of sexual misconduct on university campuses are addressed under the 
auspices of the Title IX Coordinator.5 
Title IX Coordinators are a type of formal legal compliance office that was widely 
adopted in response to the Civil Rights Act of 1972.6 Similar formal offices, particularly 
Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) and Affirmative Action (AA) offices, have been 
widely studied.7 These studies identify EEO/AA offices as a sort of “non-law” structure 
that is meant to interpret and enforce law inside a bureaucratic organization.8 These studies 
of EEO/AA offices mainly compare these offices to a court-like ideal and, in light of this 
comparison, generally observe that these types of offices, although legally framed, tend 
toward more informality in practice.9 Title IX Coordinators are just such a structure, and, 
like EEO/AA offices, operate somewhat more informally than the court-like ideal. 
                                                          
very special thank you to my dissertation committee at the University of Kansas: Charles Epp, H. George Fred-
erickson, Steven Maynard-Moody, Rosemary O’Leary, Marilu Goodyear, and Robert Shelton. Any errors are 
mine alone. I conducted the interviews referenced in this work anonymously with the approval of, and under the 
procedures established by, the University of Kansas Institutional Review Board.   
 1. CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY, 
at vii, 5-5 (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf; David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat 
Rape and Multiple Offending Among Undetected Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 73 (2002).  
 2. This article uses the term “survivors” throughout as it represents self-determination and strength instead 
of the more commonplace usage of victim that implies weakness and powerlessness. The term “victim” is re-
tained in its original form in quotations. When discussing Title IX processes, often the term “complainant” is 
used.  
 3. William DeJong, The Impact of Alcohol on Campus Life, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON THE COLLEGE 
CAMPUS: PROMOTING STUDENT GROWTH AND RESPONSIBILITY, AND REAWAKENING THE SPIRIT OF CAMPUS 
COMMUNITY 100, 104 (David R. Karp & Thom Allena eds., 2004).  
 4. Letter from Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights to Colleague, 12 (Apr. 4, 2011) available 
at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter]. 
5 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., and its implementing regulations, 34 C.F.R. Part 106.8. 
 6. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., and its implementing regulations, 34 C.F.R. Part 106.1. 
 7. See generally Frank Dobbin & Erin L. Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional Construction of 
Legal Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1203 (2007); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and 
Organizational Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the Work Place, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401 (1990) 
[hereinafter Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance]; Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambi-
guity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992) [here-
inafter Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures]; Lauren B. Edelman, Gwendolyn Leachman & Doug 
McAdam, On Law, Organizations, and Social Movements, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 653 (2010) [hereinafter 
Edelman, On Law, Organizations, and Social Movements]; Lauren B. Edelman, Linda H. Krieger, Scott R. Eli-
ason, Catherine R. Albiston & Virginia Mellema, When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutional-
ized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888 (2011) [hereinafter Edelman, When Organizations Rule: Judi-
cial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures].  
 8. See generally Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance, supra note 7; Edelman, 
Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures, supra note 7. 
 9. See Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance, supra note 7; Edelman, Legal Am-
biguity and Symbolic Structures, supra note 7; Edelman, On Law, Organizations, and Social Movements, supra 
note 7; Edelman, When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures, su-
pra note 7.  
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In examining campus sexual misconduct, my data consist of 2011-2014 interviews 
of thirteen Title IX Coordinators from institutions of higher education nation-wide. The 
research methods consisted of open-ended interviews, content analysis of these interviews, 
and the analysis of documents relating to Title IX. The participants were from every region 
of the country. Participants were primarily from large doctoral degree granting public and 
private research institutions, but several master’s level institutions were also included.10 
The study provides a ground-level view of compliance in action. In the very best 
light, university compliance with Title IX was highly inconsistent and largely ineffective 
during this time. Title IX Coordinators depart from the formal, legal model in order to 
create substantive justice for individuals in a framework they view as overly formalistic. 
They also depart to establish professional worth, to avoid negative publicity, and to effec-
tuate managerial solutions that symbolize compliance. The results are Title IX processes 
that are less than consistent, reliable, and impartial, validating calls for increased proce-
dural protections for victims and alleged perpetrators. Overall, the picture of university 
Title IX compliance is one motivated more by symbolic enforcement than true dedication 
to ensure a hostility-free campus.  
Part I of this article describes the pervasive problem of campus sexual misconduct. 
Part II is a review of the legal context that provides the backdrop for Title IX compliance 
work. In Part III, Title IX models and processes are described, followed by evidence that 
Title IX Coordinators are both inconsistently adhering to and departing from the archetype. 
Explanations motivating the departures are explored in Part IV. The article concludes by 
recommending that Title IX Coordinators create more meaningful professional networks 
in order to do more than symbolically address campus sexual misconduct. From the per-
spective of both survivors and alleged perpetrators, Title IX compliance is neither effective 
nor equitable.  
II. THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT ON CAMPUS 
Sexual misconduct among fellow students and professors is a very serious problem 
and universities face a dilemma in how to deal with it. There is an epidemic of peer sexual 
violence on campuses across the nation. With studies ranging from the mid-1980s to 2015, 
the effort to combat campus peer sexual violence is in its fourth decade.11 A 2015 study 
of twenty-seven institutions of higher education found “[o]ne-third (33.1[percent]) of sen-
ior females . . . report being a victim of nonconsensual sexual contact at least once” during 
                                                          
 10.  The sensitive nature of the topic restricted the sample size. As the numbers interviewed grew, the stories 
and commentary became repetitive. While it is possible that the twenty-seven officials who agreed to be inter-
viewed were somehow systematically different from others who declined, I suspect that they were more typical 
than unique. The participants, while relatively small in number, do not appear to be systematically skewed in any 
obvious ways. These interviews provide insight into the nature of Title IX compliance between 2011 and 2014.   
 11. Nancy Chi Cantalupo, “Decriminalizing” Campus Institutional Responses to Peer Sexual Violence, 38 
J.C. & U.L. 481, 484 (2012).  
3
Pappas: Dear Colleague: Title IX Coordinators and Inconsistent Compliance
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
PAPPAS_FINAL_11-30 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2016 11:16 AM 
124 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:121 
their time in college.12 Approximately half of these were victims of nonconsensual pene-
tration involving one of the four tactics (physical or threat of physical force; incapacitation; 
coercion; and absence of affirmative consent).13 
Research shows that a small number of repeat perpetrators commit the vast majority 
of sexual violence, requiring mechanisms for identifying and stopping these repeat offend-
ers.14 A 2002 study surveyed 1,882 male university students and found that 4 percent of 
the study’s subjects accounted for 28 percent of the violence, a rate ten times greater than 
that of non-rapists.15 Fraternity men have been identified as more likely to perpetrate sex-
ual crimes than non-fraternity men.16 A 1996 study found male student-athletes made up 
3.3 percent of the population at Division I institutions, but represented 19 percent of the 
alleged sexual assault or domestic violence perpetrators in judicial affairs records.17 High 
profile cases of sexual violence by athletes persist, including the rape allegations against 
Heisman Trophy-winning quarterback Jameis Winston,18 the delay, and ultimate expul-
sion of University of Michigan Kicker Brendan Gibbons,19 and the 2011 suicide of Uni-
versity of Missouri Swimmer Sasha Menu Courey, sixteen months after an uninvestigated 
allegation of rape by a football player.20 
Evidence indicates sexual misconduct is widely underreported. A 2007 survey indi-
cated that only 16 percent of physically forced survivors and 8 percent of incapacitated 
sexual assault survivors contacted a survivor’s, crisis, or health care center after the inci-
dent.21 Only 2 percent of incapacitated survivors and 13 percent of physically forced sur-
vivors report the incident to law enforcement.22 Other studies estimate that ninety percent 
or more of survivors of campus sexual assault do not report the incident.23 A 2015 study 
of twenty-seven institutions of higher education found “a relatively small percentage (e.g., 
28[percent] or less) of even the most serious incidents are reported.”24 
Evidence indicates non-reporting occurs due to a fear of reprisal and a belief the 
process will not work or not be fair. In a 2001 survey of graduate students, 21 percent of 
those experiencing harassment reported the behavior, 30 percent experienced retaliation 
                                                          
 12. DAVID CANTOR ET AL., REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND 
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT xiv (Sept. 21, 2015), available at http://www.upenn.edu/ir/sur-
veys/AAU/Report%20and%20Tables%20on%20AAU%20Campus%20Climate%20Survey.pdf.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Lisak & Miller, supra note 1, at 78. 
 15. Id at 80.  
 16. KREBS, supra note 1, at 2-11.  
 17. Todd W. Crosset et al., Male Student-Athletes and Violence Against Women: A Survey of Campus Judicial 
Affairs Offices, 2 J. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 163, 171-73 (1996).  
 18. Michael McCann, Don’t Stay in School, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 20, 2014, at 13. 
 19. Matt Slovin & Adam Rubenfire, Former Kicker Brendan Gibbons Permanently Separated from Univer-
sity for Sexual Misconduct, THE MICH. DAILY (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.michigandaily.com/sports/former-
kicker-brendan-gibbons-expelled-sexual-misconduct.  
 20. Tom Farrey & Nicole Noren, Mizzou did not Pursue Alleged Assault, ESPN.COM (Mar. 1, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10323102/university-missouri-officials-did-not-pursue-rape-case-lines-
investigation-finds.  
 21. KREBS, supra note 1, at xvii. 
 22. Id.  
 23. BONNIE FISHER, FRANCIS T. CULLEN & MICHAEL G. TURNER, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE 
WOMEN: RESEARCH REPORT, 21-26 (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/182369.pdf.  
 24. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 12, at iv.  
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after reporting, and 58 percent believed the reporting process and complaint handling 
could be improved.25 According to the 2015 study, more than 50 percent of victims of 
serious incidents do not report because they do not consider it “serious enough.”26 
The problem especially occurs within relationships (romantic as well as hierar-
chical), making it more difficult for survivors to come forward. Most perpetrators of rape 
or attempted rape are known to the survivor, because they are often classmates and friends 
(70 percent of completed rapes) and boyfriends or ex-boyfriends (23.7 percent of com-
pleted rapes and 14.5 percent of attempted rapes).27 Employee-to-student and faculty-to-
student sexual misconduct are also campus problems that implicate Title IX. Employee 
misconduct more generally is an ongoing problem as indicated by the Jerry Sandusky child 
sexual abuse scandal and scandals at Syracuse University, University of Texas, the Uni-
versity of Arkansas, and many other examples.28 The decentralized environment, the focus 
on academic pursuits, and the hierarchical intellectual environment allow harassing be-
haviors to go unchecked in academic institutions.29 
In part, the breadth of the problem is a product of the university context itself, re-
quiring that institutions take action to remediate the effects of sexual misconduct. In a 2014 
survey of more than 300 schools commissioned by Senator Claire McCaskill, more than 
40 percent of U.S. colleges and universities conducted no investigations of sexual assault 
allegations over the past five years.30 Further, the survey found that only 16 percent of 
schools conduct “climate surveys” to determine the prevalence of sexual assault on cam-
pus, and only about half of colleges have a hotline that survivors can call to report a sexual 
assault.31 Nearly 73 percent of schools do not have protocols for how campus authorities 
and local law enforcement should work together on cases.32 
Employee perceptions of organizational tolerance to sexual harassment are signifi-
cantly related to the frequency of sexual harassment incidents and the effectiveness in 
combating the problem.33 Organizationally, studies reveal that where a choice of sanctions 
for harassment is available, it is common for the least stringent to be selected, such as a 
                                                          
 25. ACADEMIC INCIVILITY AND THE GRADUATE/PROFESSIONAL STUDENT EXPERIENCE: SUMMARY OF 
SPRING 2011 SURVEY OF UMN-TC GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL STUDENTS 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.sos.umn.edu/assets/pdf/Survey%20Summary%202011%20(revised%208-12-11).pdf.  
 26. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 12, at iv.  
 27. FISHER, CULLEN & TURNER, supra note 23, at 19.  
 28. Christian Dennie, Post Penn State: Protecting Against Sexual Harassment and Misconduct in Athletics, 
75 TEX. B.J. 828, 828-830 (2012); Diane Heckman, Title IX and Sexual Harassment Claims Involving Educa-
tional Athletic Department Employees and Student-Athletes in the Twenty-First Century, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 223 (2009).  
 29. Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Workplace Harassment in the Academic Environment, 56 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 81, 83 (2011). 
 30. Mary Beth Marklein & Deirdre Shesgreen, Colleges Ignoring Sexual Assault, Senator Charges, USA 
TODAY (July 9, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/07/09/claire-mccaskill-college-sexual-
assault-report/12400401/. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Camille Gallivan Nelson, Jane A Halpert & Douglas F. Cellar, Organizational Responses for Preventing 
and Stopping Sexual Harassment: Effective Deterrents or Continued Endurance? 56 SEX ROLES 811 (2007); 
Kathi Miner-Rubio & Lilia M. Cortina, Working in a Context of Hostility Toward Women: Implications for Em-
ployees’ Well-being, 9 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 107 (2004). 
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formal or informal warning without further action.34 Such responses indicate a deflection 
of organizational responsibility and may indicate a “climate of tolerance.”35 
In sum, Title IX Coordinators face a context in which there is a lot of sexual mis-
conduct by students and university employees, repeat offenders cause a lot of the prob-
lems, misconduct most frequently occurs within romantic and other relationships involv-
ing power dynamics, and survivors are very hesitant to come forward. It is important to 
have processes in place that facilitate rather than discourage individuals to make com-
plaints. It is also important to have processes that fairly adjudicate responsibility for mis-
conduct. Finally, it is important to have mechanisms for ensuring that university leaders 
know about significant problems and to develop ways to address them. 
III. THE LEGAL CONTEXT FOR CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT  
The legal environment puts pressure on universities to address the problem of sexual 
misconduct through the lens of individual complaints.36 The Department of Education’s 
Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is tasked with enforcing Title IX of the Educational Amend-
ments of 1972.37 Title IX promotes equity in academic and athletic programs, prohibits 
hostile environments on the basis of sex, prohibits sexual harassment and sexual violence, 
and directs universities to protect complainants against retaliation and to remedy the ef-
fects of other gender-based forms of discrimination.38 Congress adopted Title IX in order 
to effectuate a complaint-driven remedy, rather than authorize a federal enforcement 
agency (like the National Labor Relations Board) to oversee and direct broad reforms in 
the regulated sector.39 Originally codified in the Title IX implementing regulations, fed-
eral funding recipients are required to “designate at least one employee to coordinate its 
efforts to comply with and carry out its responsibilities under [Title IX], including any 
investigation of any complaint communicated to such recipient alleging its noncompliance 
with [Title IX] or alleging any actions which would be prohibited by [Title IX].”40 In 
response to Title IX, universities created Title IX compliance officers and organizational 
mechanisms for addressing individual complaints of sexual harassment and gender ineq-
uities. Over thirty-years after Title IX’s implementation, this role is now known as a Title 
IX Coordinator. 
According to the Association for Title IX Administrators (ATIXA), there are 25,000 
individuals who assure Title IX compliance in schools, colleges, and universities across 
                                                          
 34. Denise Salin, Organizational Responses to Workplace Harassment: An Exploratory Study, 38 PERS. REV. 
26 (2007).  
 35. Paula McDonald, Workplace Sexual Harassment 30 Years on: A Review of the Literature, 14 INT’L J. 
MGMT. REVS. 1, 9 (2012).  
 36. Julie Novkov, Equality, Process, and Campus Sexual Assault, 75 MD. L. REV. 590, 614-15 (2016) 
 (“I observe here that, thus far, we have been thinking of campus sexual assault as a private and individualized 
criminal or quasi-criminal wrong in which campus authorities become involved because of the need to resolve 
disputes between and among students.”).  
 37. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 38. Id.  
 39. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2010).  
 40. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8 (a) (1972). 
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the country.41 This means coordinating investigations, providing information and consul-
tation to potential complainants, and receiving formal notice of complaints. Title IX Co-
ordinators or their staff schedule, coordinate, or oversee grievance hearings, conduct in-
vestigations, make findings of violations of Title IX, notify parties of decisions, and 
provide information about the right and procedure of appeal. They also train staff, maintain 
records, ensure that timelines and procedures are followed, and provide ongoing training, 
consultation, and technical assistance. Title IX Coordinators are authorized to conduct a 
formal and defined process in order to determine whether there has been a violation of the 
law. All educational institutions are bound by their own policies and procedures, by con-
stitutional due-process mandates, state contract and civil rights law, federal education 
laws, and the oversight of the Department of Education Office of Civil Rights. “Dear Col-
league” Letters, issued through OCR, specify and clarify the requirements of Title IX. 
While these “Dear Colleague” letters lack the force of law, courts pay them great atten-
tion.42 The legal standards for compliance by universities remained unclear until OCR 
issued a “Dear Colleague” letter on April 4, 2011.43 
The Dear Colleague Letter issued on April 4, 2011, dramatically shifted the inter-
pretation of Title IX enforcement by prescribing the knowledge44 and evidentiary stand-
ards45 for handling sexual misconduct disputes and by requiring universities to address 
student-to-student sexual misconduct whether on or off campus.46 The letter also provides 
guidance on what constitutes fair procedures, including discouraging schools from allow-
ing the parties to question or cross-examine one another, giving institutions discretion to 
determine whether to permit parties to have counsel (provided both sides are treated 
equally), and mandating that both parties have the right to invoke an appeal process.47 The 
letter also requires educational training for employees,48 implementation of preventative 
education programs, and provision of comprehensive survivor resources.49 Finally, the 
                                                          
 41. Ass’n of Title IX Admin., About ATIXA and Title IX, ATIXA, https://atixa.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 
26, 2016). 
 42. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984), (directing courts to 
defer to administrative interpretations of their authorizing legislation except when those interpretations contra-
vene the law).  
 43. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4, at 11. 
 44. Id. at 4 (A university must take action “[i]f a school knows or reasonably should know about student-on-
student harassment that creates a hostile environment.” This interpretation represented a sharp departure from 
the “actual knowledge and deliberate indifference” standard for private lawsuits for monetary damages. Schools 
can no longer avoid knowledge of sexual harassment and it is much easier to show that responsible university 
employees knew or should have known of the misconduct).  
 45. Id. at 11 (requiring the use of a preponderance-of-the evidence standard, noting that “[t]he ‘clear and 
convincing’ standard . . . currently used by some schools, is a higher [and improper] standard of proof”).  
 46. Id. at 4 (dramatically increasing the scope of cases for which Title IX Coordinators are responsible, 
“[s]chools may have an obligation to respond to student-on-student sexual harassment that initially occurred off 
school grounds, outside a school’s education program or activity” and “[i]f a student files a complaint with the 
school, regardless of where the conduct occurred, the school must process the complaint in accordance with its 
established procedures”). 
 47. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4, at 12.  
 48. Id., at 4, 12 (requiring training for employees likely to witness or receive reports of sexual misconduct 
and declaring that in sexual violence cases the fact-finder and the decision-maker should have adequate training 
or knowledge regarding sexual violence). 
 49. Id. at 14.  
7
Pappas: Dear Colleague: Title IX Coordinators and Inconsistent Compliance
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
PAPPAS_FINAL_11-30 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2016 11:16 AM 
128 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:121 
2011 Dear Colleague Letter affirms the requirement that universities are required to em-
ploy a Title IX Coordinator and clarifies that Title IX coordinators should not have other 
job responsibilities that may create a conflict of interest.50 
OCR released a Q&A document in 2014 to further provide clarification on what 
constitutes compliance with Title IX. Title VII,51 the 2013 reauthorization of VAWA (Pub. 
L. 113-4),52 the Clery Act,53 FERPA,54 due process rights,55 and administrative law all 
add additional legal requirements. Further, survivors may enforce their rights via private 
action initiated against their schools.56 
In concert with the new law, federal administrators made it clear that preventing and 
handling campus sexual assaults must be a university priority. In January 2014, President 
Obama pledged to develop a coordinated federal response to combat campus sexual as-
sault.57 President Obama created a White House Task Force on Protecting Students From 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 7 (noting that “serving as the Title IX coordinator and a disciplinary hearing board member or 
general counsel may create a conflict of interest”). 
 51. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2006) (prohibiting employers from 
discriminating in the terms and conditions of employment based upon “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin”). 
 52. The 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA, Pub. L. 113-4) specifically in-
cluded the Campus Sexual Violence Elimination Act in Section 303 (Grants to Combat Violent Crimes on Cam-
puses) and Section 304 (Campus Sexual Violence, Domestic Violence, Dating Violence, and Stalking Education 
and Prevention). Originally signed into law in 1994 as Title IV, sec. 40001-40703 of the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) provided $1.6 billion toward investiga-
tion and prosecution of violent crimes against women, imposed automatic and mandatory restitution on those 
convicted, and allowed civil redress in cases prosecutors chose to leave unprosecuted. Reauthorized by Congress 
initially in 2000 and 2005, the Act also established an Office on Violence Against Women (OVAW) within the 
Department of Justice. OVAW administers grant programs to reduce domestic violence, dating violence, sexual 
assault, and stalking on campus. In 2014, federal regulations were issued (34 CFR Part 668) clarifying the 2013 
VAWA reauthorization. Specifically, they require institutions to maintain statistics (including numbers of un-
founded crime reports), to educate incoming students and new employees, to engage in ongoing awareness cam-
paigns, to describe disciplinary proceedings in detail, to detail a list of possible sanctions, and to indicate the 
range of protective measures the institution may offer.  
 53. The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (“Clery Act”) 
is a federal statute that requires all colleges and universities that participate in federal financial aid programs to 
keep and disclose information about crime on and near their respective campuses. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f). Schools 
must publish policies designed to prevent sexual violence and respond to it once it occurs, 20 U.S.C. § 1092 
(f)(8)(A)(2008))), that include specific information about: 1) reporting (20 U.S.C. § 1092 (f)(8)(B)(iii)(2008)); 
2) the survivor’s right to notify law enforcement and receive school assistance in doing so (20 U.S.C. § 1092 
(f)(8)(B)(v)(2008)); 3) instructions to survivors as how to preserve evidence of sexual violence (20 U.S.C. § 1092 
(f)(8)(B)(iii)(2008)); 4) information about options and assistance for changing living and educational arrange-
ment (20 USC §1092 (f)(8)(B)(vii)(2008)); and 5) disciplinary procedures that explicitly treat accuser and ac-
cused equally in terms of having others present at hearings and to know disciplinary outcomes (20 U.S.C. § 1092 
(f)(8)(B)(iv)(2008)).  
 54. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) (20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 CFR Part 99) protects 
against the unauthorized disclosure of confidential student education records. It grants parents of minor-aged 
students and students 18 and older the right to access educational records, to challenge the records’ contents, and 
to have control over disclosure of personally identifiable information in the records. Applying to all schools 
receiving federal funds, Congress has modified FERPA nine times, most significantly with the passage of the 
Clery Act.  
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating “[n]o person shall be held. . . nor shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law”); U.S. CONST. amend. IV, §1 (binding the states to the same language).  
 56. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1666 (1999) (holding a private damages action for 
sexual harassment may proceed on Title IX grounds only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indif-
ference to known acts of harassment and the harassment is “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that 
it effectively bars the survivor’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit”). 
 57. Libby Sander, Obama Promises Government Wide Scrutiny of Campus-Rape Issue, CHRON. HIGHER 
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Sexual Assault, designed to provide colleges with information on best practices, ensure 
compliance with legal obligations, increase the transparency of federal enforcement, in-
crease the public’s awareness of individual colleges’ compliance with the law, and facili-
tate coordination among federal agencies.58 The White House Task Force (WHTF) issued 
its first report, Not Alone, in April 2014, and created a website, notalone.gov, to provide 
resources for schools and students.59 The task force report recommends campus climate 
surveys,60 actively engaging with men, and actively creating campus bystander programs 
to change campus cultures.61 The report also recommends giving survivors more control 
over the process by ensuring a place to go for confidential advice and support.62 Finally, 
it recommends training for officials in how to address the trauma that attends sexual as-
sault.63 
Since OCR began tracking sexual misconduct Title IX complaints in 2009, the num-
ber of complaints has risen exponentially, from 11 cases in 2009 to 33 cases in April of 
2014.64 As of November 1, 2014, more than eighty colleges were under federal investiga-
tion for possible violations of Title IX.65 Despite this trend, an analysis of Title IX com-
plaints filed with the Department of Education from 2003 to 2013 found that fewer than 
one in ten led to a formal agreement to change campus policies.66 As of October 17, 2016, 
there are 279 open federal Title IX investigations underway.67 
Increased attention to sexual misconduct has also led to a proliferation of complaints 
and lawsuits. In January of 2013, student Andrea Pino, two other students, an alumna, and 
a former administrator made a federal complaint against the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill accusing the university of negligently handling its responses to rape.68 Stu-
dents elsewhere filed similar complaints against universities like Amherst, Berkeley, Dart-
mouth, Occidental, Swarthmore, and Vanderbilt.69 In 2014, the University of Connecticut 
announced it would pay nearly $1.3 million to settle a federal lawsuit filed by five current 
and former female undergraduate students claiming the university had mishandled their 
sexual assault complaints.70 In January 2016, Florida State agreed to pay $950,000 to settle 
                                                          
EDUC., Jan. 31, 2014.  
 58. Id.  
 59. THE FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, 
NOT ALONE (2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/report_0.pdf. 
 60. Id. at 8. 
 61. Id. at 2. 
 62. Id. at 17. 
 63. Id. at 3-4. 
 64. Jonah Newman & Libby Sander, A Promise Unfulfilled, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 9, 2014, at A24. 
 65. Max Lewontin, Final Federal Rules on Sexual Violence Emphasize Training, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Oct. 31, 2014, at A4.  
 66. Newman & Sander, supra note 64.  
 67. Campus Sexual Assault Under Investigation, CHRONICLE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, http://projects.chron-
icle.com/titleix/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016) (listing 279 open federal investigations).  
 68. Libby Sander, Anti-Rape Activist, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 13, 2013, at A20.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Monica Vendituoli, UConn Will Pay $1.3-Million to Settle 5 Women’s Sexual-Assault Lawsuit, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 1, 2014, at A4.  
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a federal lawsuit with a former student who brought an accusation against quarterback 
Jameis Winston.71 
Students accused of sexual misconduct are also filing complaints. Daniel Kopin, a 
former student at Brown University, sent a letter to the U.S. Education Department’s Of-
fice for Civil Rights, sharing his side of a sexual encounter that resulted in his suspen-
sion.72 In June 2013, Peter Yu sued Vassar College, arguing that the college denied him 
due process throughout the sexual misconduct disciplinary process and had discriminated 
against him because of his sex.73 Specifically, Yu claimed officials did not properly advise 
him of grievance policies and did not allow him legal representation at the disciplinary 
hearing.74 Similar complaints were filed against St. Joseph’s University in July 2013, and 
a federal lawsuit was filed against Xavier University in August 2013, claiming that the 
university conducted a fundamentally unfair hearing.75 These three lawsuits all share sev-
eral common allegations: campus officials withheld key evidence in hearings, they were 
hasty to rush to judgment, and a general presumption of guilt prevailed.76 In 2015, Mid-
dlebury College, the University of Southern California, and UC-San Diego were all or-
dered to reinstate expelled students.77 Nearly fifty lawsuits by accused students are in pro-
cess, an increase from roughly twelve in 2013.78 In sum, young men are as unhappy with 
the outcome of college investigations as their accusers, and both sides often find the pro-
cess unfair.79 
Attorneys representing both survivors and the accused report they are seeing an up-
tick in cases. Brett Sokolow, president of the National Center for Higher Education Risk 
Management (which also oversees ATIXA, the Association of Title IX Administrators) 
notes receiving nearly sixty calls from accused students and their parents, of which he is 
now representing roughly a dozen.80 Another attorney, Andrew Miltenberg, reported re-
ceiving fifteen calls each month in 2014.81  
In a June 2016 report issued by the American Association of University Profes-
sors (AAUP), incorrect OCR interpretation and overzealous administrative implementa-
tion were described as the cause of undue restrictions on teaching, research, speech, aca-
demic freedom, and due process.82 The AAUP argued that both the university response 
                                                          
 71. Rachel Axon, Florida State Agrees to Pay Winston Accuser $950,000 to Settle Suit, USA TODAY, (Janu-
ary 25, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2016/01/25/florida-state-settles-title-ix-lawsuit-er-
ica-kinsman-jameis-winston/79299304/ (last visited Feb 15, 2016).  
 72. Libby Sander, Opening New Front in Campus-Rape Debate, Brown Student Tells Education Dept. His 
Side, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 12, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/Opening-New-Front-in/147047.  
 73. Libby Sander, 3 Students, Accused of Sexual Misconduct, Sue their Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Sept. 30, 2013, at A14.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Tovia Smith, For Students Accused of Campus Rape, Legal Victories Win Back Rights, (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/10/15/446083439/for-students-accused-of-campus-rape-legal-victories-win-back-
rights.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Robin Wilson, On New Front in Rape Debate, Student Tells Education Department His Side, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., June 20, 2014, at A11.  
 80. Robin Wilson, Presumed Guilty, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 5, 2014, at A38.  
 81. Id.  
 82. The History, Uses, and Abuses of Title IX, American Association of University Professors, June, 2016 
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and the criminal justice system serve “neither survivors nor alleged perpetrators with any 
notable degree of fairness.”83 The core due process arguments advanced include 1) a lack 
of a hearing with 2) the right to confrontation and cross examination, and 3) incorrect use 
of the preponderance of evidence standard of proof.84  
An additional criticism against current Title IX enforcement is that the “Dear Col-
league” Letters are not merely interpretive, but instead promulgate new rules and require-
ments in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.85 Considered interpretive rules, 
the “Dear Colleague” letters are defined by the Supreme Court as those “issued by an 
agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules it admin-
isters” that otherwise “do not have the force and effect of law.”86 Despite lacking the force 
of law, courts pay them great attention.87 Recent letters from Oklahoma Senator James 
Lankford to the U.S. Department of Education challenges the legitimacy of recent “Dear 
Colleague” letters by arguing they create substantive changes and require the use of APA 
rulemaking procedures.88  
Title IX Coordinators currently address campus sexual misconduct in an uncertain, 
legalized environment characterized by growing complaints, liability pressure, and legal-
ized directives from the Department of Education’s OCR. With the election of Donald 
Trump, federal oversight of how colleges and universities handle sexual assault will likely 
subside or disappear.89 The Republican Platform notes that sexual assault should be “in-
vestigated by civil authorities and prosecuted in a courtroom, not a faculty lounge.”90 De-
spite facing less enforcement from the federal government, universities and colleges will 
likely still follow the letter and spirit of Title IX as Title IX and the accompanying regu-
lations will still be obligatory.91 
 
                                                          
(Describing the use of role playing exercises in a Deviance in U.S. Society course and other content that could 
trigger victims at 82-85; Mandating reporting requirements in sexual harassment research activities at 85; de-
scribing freedom of speech issues with  anonymous technology apps and student publications at 86-87), 
https://www.aaup.org/file/TitleIXreport.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2016)[hereinafter AAUP] 
 83. Id. at 58.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Letter from James Lankford, Chairman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management, 
to John B. King, Jr., Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Education (Jan. 7, 2016) (citing Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 §553 (1946).   
 86. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015).  
 87. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984) (directing courts to 
defer to administrative interpretations of their authorizing legislation except when those interpretations contra-
vene the law).   
 88. Letter from James Lankford, Chairman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management, 
to John B. King, Jr., Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Education (Jan. 7, 2016); Letter from James Lank-
ford, Chairman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management, to John B. King, Jr., Acting 
Secretary, U.S. Department of Education (Mar. 4, 2016). 
 89.  Robin Wilson, Trump Administration May Back Away form Title IX, but Campuses Won’t, CHRONICLE 




 90. Jake New, Campus Sexual Assault in a Trump Era, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.in-
sidehighered.com/news/2016/11/10/trump-and-gop-likely-try-scale-back-title-ix-enforcement-sexual-assault. 
 91. Wilson, supra note 89.  
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IV. TITLE IX MODELS AND PROCESSES 
The archetypal Title IX Coordinator’s legal authority includes the power to investi-
gate, make recommendations, and enforce both the law and university rules. Under the 
ATIXA Statement of Ethics and Title IX Coordinator Competencies, the coordinator must 
“consult[] with relevant policy-making bodies and senior personnel for the purpose of ad-
vising, clarifying and identifying necessary action to eliminate sex and/or gender-based 
discrimination in all educational programs and activities.”92 Further, the model Coordina-
tor must have the “[a]bility to recommend and/or effect changes to policies, to revise prac-
tices and to implement equitable procedures across many departments.”93 Additionally, 
the archetypal Coordinator is expected “to manage a caseload of civil rights grievances to 
a prompt, effective and equitable remedy.”94 When issuing investigative reports, the report 
should include an assessment of credibility, the weight of the evidence, and conclusions 
and findings.95 
The archetypal Title IX Coordinator has the authority to enforce Title IX and to 
investigate, determine violations, issue recommendations, and make interim accommoda-
tions. The authority is founded on law and law-based policy. As a result, the Title IX Co-
ordinator archetype operates a formal office for handling disputes that in many respects is 
similar to a police investigator or prosecutor. Like the police investigator or a prosecutor, 
the Title IX Coordinator archetype uses a formal process designed to identify, via formal 
investigation, whether the facts indicate compliance with Title IX law. First, this section 
describes the formal processes utilized by Title IX Coordinators, including the Hearing, 
Investigation, and Hybrid models. Next, the section describes how Title IX Coordinators 
adhere to the archetype. Finally, the section describes Title IX Coordinators departing from 
the standard model. 
A. Title IX “Hearing” Model 
The Association for Student Conduct Administration identifies “Hearing” and “In-
vestigation” models for resolving allegations of sexual misconduct.96 In the Hearing 
Model, an investigation takes place prior to a hearing to determine whether there is enough 
information to substantiate a complaint, to provide separation between the investigation 
and adjudication functions, and to allow a trained professional to complete the fact-finding 
work for the hearing body.97 The Title IX Coordinator in a Hearing Model may act as an 
                                                          
 92. ASSOCIATION FOR TITLE IX ADMINISTRATORS, STATEMENT OF ETHICS AND TITLE IX COORDINATOR 
COMPETENCIES 5 (2012), https://www.atixa.org/documents/ATIXA%20StatementofEthics.TitleIXCoordinator 
Competencies.doc.  
 93. Id. at 6.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Belinda Guthrie, ATIXA Tip of the Week, ATIXA TIP OF THE WEEK NEWSLETTER (Jan. 9, 2014), 
https://www.atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ATIXA-Tip-of-the-Week-01_09_14.pdf. 
 96. ASSOCIATION FOR STUDENT CONDUCT ADMINISTRATION, STUDENT CONDUCT ADMINISTRATION & 
TITLE IX: GOLD STANDARD PRACTICES FOR RESOLUTION OF ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT ON 
COLLEGE CAMPUSES 15-16 (2014), http://www.myacpa.org/sites/de-
fault/files/ASCA%202014%20Gold%20Standard%20Report.pdf.  
 97. Id. at 15.  
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investigator and present his or her findings of fact to the hearing body.98 Additionally, the 
Title IX Coordinator may act as an advisor to the hearing body regarding correct proce-
dures, as logistical support to coordinate schedules, and as a complainant initiating com-
plaints on behalf of the college.99 The hearing body may be administrative and involve 
only one adjudicator or a combined panel of at least three members comprising faculty, 
staff, or students.100 The key aspect of the hearing model is that the panel or administrator, 
not the Title IX Coordinator, makes the initial determination. 
As an example, Pennsylvania State University follows a Hearing Model for resolv-
ing allegations of sexual misconduct.101 Each case is assigned to a case manager, who 
investigates to determine if the information acquired reasonably supports a Code of Con-
duct violation and then recommends charges and sanctions.102 If the alleged perpetrator 
contests the charges, the matter is forwarded to a hearing after which either side may ap-
peal.103 Likewise, Harvard Law School’s process previously utilized a traditional hearing 
model in which the Title IX investigation determines whether there is enough information 
to proceed to a hearing.104 The Harvard Law School procedures have been updated to 
mirror the investigation model adopted by the broader university and are in force on an 
interim basis, but not without dispute.105 Last October 28, members of the Harvard Law 
School Faculty signed a letter objecting to the policy and procedures enacted by Harvard 
in July of 2014.106 They argue the procedures “lack the most basic elements of fairness 
and due process,” most notably the lack of an adversarial hearing.107 The absence of an 
adversarial hearing is one of the key features of the Investigation Model. 
B. Title IX Investigation Model 
Under an Investigation Model, a complaint is assigned to an investigator who inter-
views the victim and determines interim actions or remedies.108 The alleged perpetrator is 
                                                          
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. OFFICE OF STUDENT CONDUCT, CODE OF CONDUCT & STUDENT CONDUCT PROCEDURES (University of 
Pennsylvania ed, 2016), available at http://studentaffairs.psu.edu/conduct/Procedures.shtml.   
 102. Id. at 20. 
 103. Id. at 21-22. 
 104. HLS Sexual Harassment Resources and Procedures for Students, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (Dec. 18, 
2014), http://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2015/07/HLSTitleIXProcedures150629.pdf. 
 105. Title IX Information, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://hls.harvard.edu/about/title-ix-information/ (last vis-
ited April 1, 2015), includes both sets of procedures. Under the heading “HLS Students and Faculty” the website 
notes “HLS has amended its Guidelines Related to Sexual Harassment on an interim basis to align them with the 
new University policy.” A link leads to the interim policy conforming to the investigation model used by the 
broader university. Further down the page, under the heading “HLS Students,” the website states, “the following 
procedures for complaints against students have been adopted by the HLS faculty, and have been submitted to 
the U.S. Department of Education for review.” A link to the HLS Sexual Harassment Resources and Procedures 
includes the opportunity for an adversarial hearing after an investigation determines there is enough evidence to 
proceed.  
 106. Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.bos-
tonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassment-pol-
icy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html.  
 107. Id.  
 108. ASSOCIATION FOR STUDENT CONDUCT ADMINISTRATION, supra note 96, at 16. 
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then informed of the complaint and both sides have the opportunity to meet with the in-
vestigator and provide information regarding the complaint.109 Witnesses may be inter-
viewed and the investigator drafts a summary of the information, which both victim and 
alleged perpetrator may review.110 An investigation report is created and forwarded to an 
adjudicator to issue findings and sanctions.111 At Pennsylvania State University, both 
hearing and investigation options are available. An “Investigative Model” follows the 
same process as the Hearing Model, only the investigator’s findings are forwarded to a 
Title IX Decision Panel that reviews the information and makes a decision without utiliz-
ing a hearing.112 Appeals are available under either model, but only on grounds of stated 
procedures not being followed; the existence of new, unavailable evidence; and unfair 
sanctions outside of the normal ranges.113 As illustrated by Pennsylvania State’s proce-
dures, the main difference between the Investigation and Hearing models is the right to 
have a hearing. In both circumstances the investigator issues a report with factual findings 
and conclusions. 
C. Title IX Hybrid Model 
A third approach is to use a “Hybrid” of hearing and investigation models, and this 
is the approach recommended by ATIXA’s Model Investigation Process. The Hybrid 
Model uses an approach in which the investigator makes a determination, but the accused 
is entitled to a hearing if they reject the findings in whole or in part.114 This is the approach 
utilized for students at the University of Kansas.115 
For nearly every University included in this study, the standard model is a hybrid in 
which the investigator makes interim findings that may then be appealed to a hearing over-
seen by an administrator or a panel. It is not always easy to discern the difference between 
a hybrid model and the hearing model, especially because the difference rests on whether 
the investigative report includes formal outcomes and whether the hearing is the first de-
termination or an appeal. Regardless of the model, Title IX Coordinators act similar to a 
police investigator or a prosecutor. The next section describes the Title IX process from 
complaint through appeal along with the standard derivations for the Hybrid model most 
commonly observed in this study. 
                                                          
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. OFFICE OF STUDENT CONDUCT, supra note 101, at 23-24.  
 113. Id. at 31.  
 114. ASSOCIATION FOR TITLE IX ADMINISTRATORS, THE 2013 ATIXA CAMPUS TITLE IX COORDINATOR AND 
ADMINISTRATOR TRAINING & CERTIFICATION COURSE MATERIALS 40 (2013) [hereinafter MODEL 
INVESTIGATION PROCESS], available at https://www.atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Title-IX-
Coordinator-Certification-Course-Materials.doc.  
 115. Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process, Investigation Procedures, UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
(2015), http://policy.ku.edu/IOA/discrimination-complaint-resolution#Procedure. 
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D. Title IX Processes 
University sexual misconduct policies, per Title IX requirements, define and pro-
hibit sexual misconduct and specify Title IX complaint procedures. These policies de-
scribe where complaints may be made, and they often require different campus groups 
(faculty, staff, students, etc.) to use specific offices for making reports.116 Common to all 
institutions studied, a complaint may be brought directly to the University’s Title IX Co-
ordinator or to any deputy coordinators. Complaint procedures typically indicate which 
community members are required to report, including supervisors, managers, and any em-
ployees designated as mandatory reporters.117 For individuals who do not want to make a 
report, but want to speak with someone confidentially, some processes recommend that 
complainants should take their complaints to university counseling services or (less fre-
quently) the university ombuds office.118 
After a complaint is received, grievance procedures are used for carrying out the 
investigation and resolution of the complaint. Complaints are initially investigated under 
the oversight of the university’s Title IX Coordinator. The ATIXA 2013 Training Manual 
describes a Model Investigation Process that places the Title IX Coordinator archetype as 
the centralized receptacle for complaints and also the locus of complaint handling, whether 
formal or informal.119 The Model requires the Coordinator or his or her investigator to 
conduct an immediate initial investigation to determine if there is reasonable cause to 
charge the accused individual, meet with the complainant to finalize the complaint, and 
prepare the notice of charges.120 
Interim measures, such as changes to class or housing assignments for students or 
work assignments for employees, may be taken to promote safety.121 These changes de-
pend on a variety of factors, including but not limited to the severity of the alleged mis-
conduct.122 Most policies provide for confidentiality to the extent allowed by law,123 pro-
hibit retaliation,124 and allow the institution to investigate incidents of which it has become 
aware without a formal complaint.125 Institutions typically will conduct an investigation 
and proceed with further adjudication on the basis of that information, even without the 
cooperation of the individuals involved.126 
                                                          
 116. ASSOCIATION FOR STUDENT CONDUCT ADMINISTRATION, supra note 96, at 25. 
 117. Id.  
 118. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, University Policy on Relationship Violence & Sexual Misconduct, 
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY 18 (2015), https://www.hr.msu.edu/documents/uwidepolproc/RVSM_Policy.htm 
 119. MODEL INVESTIGATION PROCESS, supra note 114, at 39. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 46. 
 122. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: 
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES (2001), in 
ASSOCIATION FOR TITLE IX ADMINISTRATORS, THE 2013 ATIXA CAMPUS TITLE IX COORDINATOR AND 
ADMINISTRATOR TRAINING & CERTIFICATION COURSE MATERIALS 281, 293 (2013), available at 
https://www.atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Title-IX-Coordinator-Certification-Course-
Materials.doc. 
 123. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 118, at 14.  
 124. See, e.g., id. at 21.  
 125. See, e.g., id. at 25.  
 126. See, e.g., id. at 14. 
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Every sexual misconduct complaint should be investigated without exception.127 
There is a preference for official complaints. Where survivors are reluctant to make formal 
complaints or seek to withdraw a formal complaint, Title IX Coordinators should honor 
that request but try “to persuade (not coerce) the alleged victim to reconsider.”128 
E. Notice 
After finalizing the complaint and the notice of charges, the Title IX Coordinators 
or their staff will then “[c]ommence a thorough, reliable and impartial investigation by 
developing a strategic investigation plan, including a witness list, evidence list, intended 
timeframe, and order of interviews for all witnesses and the accused individual, who may 
be given notice prior to or at the time of the interview.”129 Brett Sokolow describes notice 
as one area in which this investigation model provides an advantage over a hearing model. 
In a hearing model, a complaint is received and then the accused is promptly given notice 
of the complaint. Sokolow notes: 
[The accused] then have time to fabricate a story and find friends to swear to it before they 
respond. This does not allow notice to be strategic. It should be. In an investigation model, 
we often interview the accused person last. We don’t want any party to taint the witness pool 
by playing on loyalties. It is not just the parties who lie to us, but their partisans as well. 
Getting statements from witnesses in advance of interviewing the accused student minimizes 
the potential for coordination of stories, and also gives us the ability to share conflicting 
accounts with the accused person once we have collected them.130 
ATIXA’s Investigation Protocol Checklist notes that in some circumstances it may 
be best to notify the accused immediately after receiving a formal complaint, but in others 
“interviewing witnesses and accumulating evidence first may be the best practice.”131 The 
checklist recommends that investigators “[s]trategize notifying the accused student of the 
complaint” by “[o]nly inform[ing] the accused student of the purpose of the meeting in 
advance if doing so will support your strategy, or if asked.”132 Specifically the checklist 
notes: 
Sometimes, unanticipated interviews can be unfair. In other cases, unanticipated interviews 
could be an important advantage. They should be used with discretion. If your goal is to 
build rapport and trust with the accused student, unanticipated interviews may undermine 
                                                          
 127. W. Scott Lewis, et al., NCHERM 10TH ANNIVERSARY WHITE PAPER (2010), in ASSOCIATION FOR TITLE 
IX ADMINISTRATORS, THE 2013 ATIXA CAMPUS TITLE IX COORDINATOR AND ADMINISTRATOR TRAINING & 
CERTIFICATION COURSE MATERIALS 139 (2013), available at https://www.atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/up-
loads/2013/09/Title-IX-Coordinator-Certification-Course-Materials.doc. 
 128. ASSOCIATION FOR TITLE IX ADMINISTRATORS, THE 2013 ATIXA CAMPUS TITLE IX COORDINATOR AND 
ADMINISTRATOR TRAINING & CERTIFICATION COURSE MATERIALS 53-54 (2013) [hereinafter INVESTIGATION 
PROTOCOL CHECKLIST], available at https://www.atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Title-IX-
Coordinator-Certification-Course-Materials.doc. 
 129. MODEL INVESTIGATION PROCESS, supra note 114, at 39. 
 130. 130.Brett A. Sokolow, CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATION MODEL, in ASSOCIATION FOR TITLE IX 
ADMINISTRATORS, THE 2013 ATIXA CAMPUS TITLE IX COORDINATOR AND ADMINISTRATOR TRAINING & 
CERTIFICATION COURSE MATERIALS 58, 64 (2013), https://www.atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/up-
loads/2013/09/Title-IX-Coordinator-Certification-Course-Materials.doc. 
 131. INVESTIGATION PROTOCOL CHECKLIST, supra note 128, at 55. 
 132. Id. 
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 52 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol52/iss1/5
PAPPAS_FINAL_11-30 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2016 11:16 AM 
2016] TITLE IX COORDINATORS AND INCONSISTENT COMPLIANCE 137 
that. Unanticipated interviews can be used when appropriate for interviewing witnesses, or 
for follow-ups with the complainant to test veracity or accuracy of descriptions.133 
Notice is thus a strategic tool the Title IX investigator archetype has as they proceed 
with an investigation. 
F. Informal Avenues 
Grievance processes may specify that the Title IX Coordinator, at his or her discre-
tion, may meet with both sides (if they both agree) in an attempt to resolve the issue.134 
There must be appropriate involvement by university personnel, for example, a trained 
counselor, mediator, or a teacher or administrator.135 Participants must be notified that at 
any time they can end the informal process and begin a formal complaint process.136 Even 
with voluntary agreement of both sides, mediation is not appropriate for use in resolving 
complaints of sexual violence, and grievance procedures should state that mediation will 
not be used for such complaints.137 
G. Investigation 
In terms of investigation techniques, Daniel Swinton notes that the goals of ques-
tioning the parties and any witnesses goes beyond “learn[ing] the truth of what happened” 
to also include learning background information, establishing a timeline, understanding 
each party’s perceptions, gathering sufficient information to determine facts and their rel-
ative importance, trying to determine what happened, ascertaining appropriate remedies, 
and learning whether there are other, related events requiring investigation.138 OCR’s 
2014 Q&A document (2014) notes that “[i]n all cases, a school’s Title IX investigation 
must be adequate, reliable, impartial, and prompt and include the opportunity for both 
parties to present witnesses and other evidence.”139 
Without unreasonable delay, the Title IX investigation must be completed, and the 
Title IX Coordinator will make a finding of a policy violation if the preponderance of the 
evidence supports such a finding.140 ATIXA’s Investigation Tips suggests the investigator 
“[s]tate a conclusion resulting from [the] investigation, if possible.”141 According to 
ATIXA Advisory Board member Belinda Guthrie, “[t]he investigation report is one of the 
most important aspects of your Title IX investigation.”142 A comprehensive investigative 
                                                          
 133. Id.  
 134. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4, at 8.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Daniel C. Swinton, When Investigating a Case of Sexual Harassment, What are the Main Goals of Ques-
tioning the Parties and Any Witnesses?, ATIXA TIP OF THE WEEK, Aug. 15, 2013, (on file with author).  
 139. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 25 (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf  
 140. MODEL INVESTIGATION PROCESS, supra note 114, at 39.  
 141. ASSOCIATION FOR TITLE IX ADMINISTRATORS, THE 2013 ATIXA CAMPUS TITLE IX COORDINATOR AND 
ADMINISTRATOR TRAINING & CERTIFICATION COURSE MATERIALS, INVESTIGATION TIPS 51 (2013), 
https://www.atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Title-IX-Coordinator-Certification-Course-
Materials.doc. 
 142. Guthrie, supra note 95. 
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report should summarize the nature of the complaint, the investigation, interviews with the 
parties and relevant witnesses, information collected, a timeline of events, and the inves-
tigator’s assessment of credibility, the weight of the evidence and conclusions and find-
ings.143 The 2013 ATIXA Training Manual recommends the investigator’s statement of 
findings (1) “List the evidence and what it shows;” (2) “Assess credibility;” (3) “Make a 
determination as to whether the evidence (facts, opinions, circumstances) establishes a 
violation of policy is more likely than not to have occurred;” and (4) “Cite concretely the 
reasons for this conclusion in a written report.”144 
H. Post-Investigation 
Following the investigation, Title IX Coordinators may take multiple different 
routes. Most Title IX Coordinators interviewed for this study had the authority to make 
determinations of Title IX violations and to make recommendations regarding potential 
sanctions. These recommendations go to either an administrator tasked with reviewing and 
confirming the Title IX Coordinator’s report and issuing sanctions,145 or to a hearing board 
or panel reviewing the Title IX Coordinator’s report and issuing appropriate sanctions.146 
Where the administrator reviews the Title IX Coordinator’s recommendations and deter-
mines sanctions, often the respondent has the ability to appeal the result to a hearing board 
or panel.147 Or, where the Title IX Coordinator’s recommendations trigger a hearing to 
determine whether a violation of Title IX occurred and to issue any resulting sanction, that 
determination can often be appealed to an administrator.148 In some situations, responsi-
bilities are divided as a panel or board determines the existence of fault and then an ad-
ministrator or the Title IX Coordinator determines the appropriate sanctions.149 
These findings are then presented to the accused, who may accept the findings in 
total, accept the findings in part, or reject all findings.150 Finally, the Title IX Coordinator 
or their staff shares the findings and updates the complainant on the status and outcome of 
                                                          
 143. Id.  
 144. INVESTIGATION PROTOCOL CHECKLIST, supra note 128, at 57.  
 145. Discrimination Complaint Handling and Resolution Process: Resolution, UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
(2015), https://policy.ku.edu/IOA/sexual-harassment-sexual-violence-procedures#resolution (“the Title IX Co-
ordinator will provide a written report of the investigation findings and recommendations to the appropriate ad-
ministrators within the University, who will determine the appropriate action to be taken in light of the investi-
gation findings and recommendations”).  
 146. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, University Policy on Relationship Violence & Sexual Misconduct: Appendix 
H, Student Conduct Review Panel Procedures, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY 1 (2015) [hereinafter Appendix H, 
Student Conduct Review Panel Procedures], https://www.hr.msu.edu/documents/uwidepolproc/AppH_Discipli-
naryProcess.pdf.  
 147. Discrimination Complaint Handling and Resolution Process: Disciplinary Action and Appeals, 
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS (2015), https://policy.ku.edu/IOA/sexual-harassment-sexual-violence-
procedures#disciplinary (“A student may request a hearing in accordance with the Code of Student Rights and 
Responsibilities.”).  
 148. OFFICE OF STUDENT CONDUCT supra note 101 (“Cases resulting in sanctions of Suspension to Expulsion 
after a hearing may be appealed to the Student Conduct Appeals Officer by the respondent within five (5) busi-
ness days of receiving official notification of the results of the hearing. Such appeals shall be in writing and shall 
be delivered to the Senior Director or his designee.”). 
 149. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DRAFT: STUDENT SEXUAL MISCONDUCT POLICY- REVISED POLICY 23 
(2015), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7xw_aoH8oKzUWxtYjZpX1FiVlU/view?usp=sharing. 
 150. MODEL INVESTIGATION PROCESS, supra note 114, at 39.  
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the investigation.151 If the accused accepts the finding of a policy violation, “[a student 
conduct office for students, or an administrative or human resources office for faculty or 
staff] will impose appropriate sanctions for the violation, after consultation with the Title 
IX Coordinator.”152 
If the accused rejects the findings (in whole or in part), it is typical in universities 
using a hybrid model described to offer a hearing to determine whether it was more likely 
or not that the accused individual is in violation. The findings of the investigation will be 
admitted at the hearing, and the investigator may give evidence, but neither is binding on 
the deciders of fact.153 
If the complaint goes to a hearing, a panel or board comprised of students, faculty, 
and staff will seek to establish (depending on the processes used above): (1) whether or 
not there is a violation of Title IX or university policy; (2) what is the appropriate sanction 
for the violation; or (3) whether the Title IX Coordinator’s or the administrator’s findings 
or sanctions were in error.154 Often, the Title IX Coordinator in such situations assumes 
the role of the complainant, and the survivor is allowed to decide whether or how much 
she or he will cooperate in the process (as co-complainant, witness, or not participating at 
all).155 In some situations observed in this study, the Title IX Coordinator serves no role, 
or serves as an impartial witness in the conduct hearing, testifying about the results of the 
investigation.156 
There is significant ambiguity regarding whether the Title IX Coordinator’s role is 
to make a judgment as if he or she were a judge, or a charge as if they were a prosecutor 
or grand jury.157 The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter prescribes a preponderance of the evi-
dence burden of proof, requiring the alleged conduct to be more likely than not to have 
occurred.158 In some situations, the standard used during a hearing is whether the Title IX 
Coordinator’s judgment was arbitrary or capricious, meaning it was without reasonable 
basis in fact.159 This deferential standard of review used in the review of discretionary 
administrative decisions generally upholds a Title IX Coordinator’s determination and in-
dicates that the “hearing” is really an appeal from a judgment. Using different standards at 
different stages is met with conflicting or ambiguous OCR guidance. On one hand, OCR 
                                                          
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 40.  
 154. ASSOCIATION FOR STUDENT CONDUCT ADMINISTRATION, supra note 96, at 15. 
 155. ASSOCIATION FOR TITLE IX ADMINISTRATORS, THE 2013 ATIXA CAMPUS TITLE IX COORDINATOR AND 
ADMINISTRATOR TRAINING & CERTIFICATION COURSE MATERIALS 79 (2013), https://www.atixa.org/word-
press/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Title-IX-Coordinator-Certification-Course-Materials.doc (“At some col-
leges, the college presents the complaint against the accused, and the alleged victim is merely a witness . . . . 
Many victims find it empowering to be more than witnesses at the hearing, and colleges should not take away 
that important healing opportunity.”). 
 156. See infra notes 198, 244, and accompanying text.  
 157. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4, at 11.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Appendix H, Student Conduct Review Panel Procedures, supra note 146, at 2 (“The written challenge 
must allege that the OIE finding was arbitrary and capricious or resulted from procedural error. A finding is 
arbitrary and capricious when the application of the policy has no reasonable basis in fact.”). 
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requires that universities use a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for all proceed-
ings.160 On the other hand, OCR also provides universities with the “flexibility to deter-
mine the type of review it will apply to appeals.”161 The OCR guidance states the type of 
review used on appeal shall be applied uniformly regardless of which side files the ap-
peal.162 
Much of the ambiguity in the Title IX Coordinator’s role corresponds to uncertainty 
in what constitutes compliance. The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter requires that Title IX 
Coordinators not have job responsibilities that create a conflict of interest (such as a dis-
ciplinary hearing board member or general counsel).163 This prescription resulted in ef-
forts to more clearly separate investigative and adjudicatory functions. Motivated by lia-
bility concerns, at least one major education insurer recommends universities handling 
student-perpetrated sexual assault to not place conclusions in the investigators report, as 
these conclusions may be seen as a judgment that is not within the authority of investiga-
tors to make.164 As a result, a minority of Title IX Coordinators in this study were limited 
to investigating and determining whether sufficient evidence (or probable cause) existed 
to trigger a hearing to determine Title IX violations and punishment. 
The investigative/adjudicatory division of roles is not a requirement of Title IX or 
OCR, and Title IX Coordinators at many institutions make “judgments” regarding out-
comes despite either conducting or directing the investigation. The OCR Q&A provides 
that the Title IX Coordinator does not necessarily have to be the person who conducts the 
investigation.165 If the Title IX Coordinator does conduct the investigation, there must not 
be a conflict of interest.166 Specific examples of a conflict of interest include where the 
Title IX Coordinator is also the Athletic Director, Dean of Students, or “serves on the 
judicial/hearing board or to whom an appeal might be made.”167 This conflict of interest 
definition suggests that Title IX does not bar the Coordinator from making the initial de-
termination of guilt or innocence, as long as they do not oversee the appeal. 
Further, an investigation is broadly defined by OCR as including the investigation, 
any hearing, the decision-making process used to determine if the conduct occurred, and 
what subsequent actions will be taken.168 While this “investigation” must include the 
equal opportunity for both parties to present witnesses and other evidence, the OCR Q&A 
document states that “Title IX does not necessarily require a hearing[,]” but there may be 
additional “legal rights or requirements under the U.S. Constitution, the Clery Act, or other 
federal, state, or local laws.”169 
                                                          
 160. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 26. 
 161. Id. at 37. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4, at 7. 
 164. ALYSSA KEEHAN, SENIOR RISK COUNSEL, UNITED EDUCATORS POWERPOINT PRESENTATION: AN 
OVERVIEW OF UE’S STUDENT SEX ASSAULT CLAIMS (2012).  
 165. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 25. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 12.  
 168. Id. at 24-25. 
 169. Id. at 25, n.28.  
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If a hearing is provided, OCR does not require universities to allow cross-examina-
tion of either side or their witnesses.170 If schools allow for cross-examination of wit-
nesses, both sides must have equal opportunity to do so.171 During a hearing on alleged 
sexual violence, OCR “strongly discourages a school from allowing the parties to person-
ally question or cross-examine each other” as it “may perpetuate a hostile environ-
ment.”172 OCR prohibits “[q]uestioning about the complainant’s sexual history with any-
one other than the alleged perpetrator” and notes, “the mere fact of a current or previous 
consensual dating or sexual relationship . . . does not itself imply consent or preclude . . . 
sexual violence.”173 The Office of Civil Rights does not require that schools allow parties 
to include their lawyers in this process, but if they do permit legal representation, both 
sides must have the same opportunity and their counsel shall be equally constrained or 
allowed to participate.174 The ATIXA 2013 Training Manual, Statement of Rights, indi-
cates that survivors and accused students have “[t]he right to have the university compel 
the presence of student, faculty and staff witnesses, and the opportunity [if desired] to ask 
questions, directly or indirectly, of witnesses [including the accused student], and the right 
to challenge documentary evidence.”175 
These prescriptions indicate that a Title IX Coordinator’s investigation providing 
opportunity for the presentation of witnesses and evidence, without an adversarial hearing 
providing for confrontation of those witnesses, satisfies Title IX requirements of what con-
stitutes a fair and balanced process. 
Additionally, there is no requirement that universities provide an appeal, but “[i]f 
the school provides for an appeal, it must do so equally for both parties.”176 OCR recom-
mends universities use an appeals process “where procedural error or previously unavail-
able relevant evidence could significantly impact the outcome of a case or where a sanction 
is substantially disproportionate to the findings.”177 OCR leaves the design of the appeals 
process to the university “as long as the entire grievance process, including any appeals, 
provides prompt and equitable resolutions of sexual violence complaints, and the school 
takes steps to protect the complainant in the educational setting during the process.”178 
According to the ATIXA Model, the appealing party must demonstrate either (1) a proce-
dural or substantive error significantly impacted the hearing’s outcome; (2) there is new 
evidence, unavailable during the original hearing or investigation, that could substantially 
impact either the finding or sanction; or (3) sanctions were disproportionate to the severity 
                                                          
 170. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 31. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4, at 12; ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 139, 
at 26. 
 175. ASSOCIATION FOR TITLE IX ADMINISTRATORS, THE 2013 ATIXA CAMPUS TITLE IX COORDINATOR 
AND ADMINISTRATOR TRAINING & CERTIFICATION COURSE MATERIALS, STATEMENT OF RIGHTS 47, 49 
(2013), available at https://www.atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Title-IX-Coordinator-
Certification-Course-Materials.doc. 
 176. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 26. 
 177. Id. at 37. 
 178. Id. 
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of the violation.179 The decision of the appeals committee or officer is final.180 Following 
the process, a prompt and effective remedy must be instituted to “end the discrimination, 
prevent its recurrence and address its effects.”181 
While OCR and Title IX do not confer the right to an adversarial hearing, or an 
appeal, the 2014 Q&A document further clarifies the interplay between due process and 
Title IX: 
The rights established under Title IX must be interpreted consistently with any federally 
guaranteed due process rights. Procedures that ensure the Title IX rights of the complainant, 
while at the same time according any federally guaranteed due process to both parties in-
volved, will lead to sound and supportable decisions. Of course, a school should ensure that 
steps to accord any due process rights do not restrict or unnecessarily delay the protections 
provided by Title IX to the complainant.182 
The ambiguity regarding the Title IX Coordinators’ role in the process is evidence 
of the informality that creeps into an ostensibly formal process within a bureaucratic or-
ganization. The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter183 and 2014 Q&A document184 provide evi-
dence of the legalizing and formalizing pressures experienced by Title IX Coordinators. 
Outside of the University’s process, complaints may be filed under Title IX with the 
U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR).185 The OCR process re-
quires that the complaint must be filed with OCR within 180 days of the date of the alleged 
discrimination.186 If the complaint is also processed through the university’s grievance 
process, an OCR complaint must be filed within 60 days of the last act of the institutional 
grievance process.187 OCR will wait for the conclusion of the institutional process prior 
to commencing its own investigation.188 Once a complaint letter is received, an investiga-
tion is conducted to determine if there has been a violation of Title IX.189 If so, OCR will 
attempt to obtain voluntary compliance and negotiate remedies.190 Enforcement action, 
such as court action by the Department of Justice before an Administrative Law judge to 
determine federal funding, may be initiated if OCR is unable to obtain voluntary compli-
ance.191 Such action has never been taken.192 Individuals can file a claim in court and do 
                                                          
 179. MODEL INVESTIGATION PROCESS, supra note 1144, at 41. 
 180. Id. at 42. 
 181. Id. at 37. 
 182. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 13. 
 183. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4. 
 184. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 139. 
 185. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, OCR COMPLAINT PROCESSING PROCEDURES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION 1, available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/complaints-how.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2016). 
 186. Id.  
 187. Id. at 4.    
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at 1.  
 190. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, OCR COMPLAINT PROCESSING PROCEDURES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION at 2-3. 
 191. Id. at 3. 
 192. See, e.g., Kristin Jones, Lax Enforcement of Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault Cases, CTR. PUB. 
INTEGRITY (Feb. 25, 2000), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/02/25/4374/lax-enforcement-title-ix-campus-
sexual-assault-cases-0.  
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not need to first file a complaint with OCR.193 If court action is commenced, OCR will 
not continue to pursue the complaint.194 
The process described above is modeled on a police-prosecutor model in which an 
investigator investigates and determines the existence of violations of law and policy and 
makes a recommendation as to the appropriate sanction. The archetypal Title IX process 
often includes the ability to accept the findings or to seek a hearing, followed by a potential 
appeal to an upper level administrator. In sum, Title IX Coordinators are an essentially 
legal compliance office within a university. They are charged by university administra-
tions with enforcing the university’s legal obligations regarding illegal discrimination and 
sexual misconduct among students and employees. In carrying out these responsibilities, 
Coordinators oversee a law-like process of investigation and adjudication. As is typical of 
organizational compliance officers, there is likely to be a considerable degree of slippage 
for the requirements of the formal law. Nonetheless, the basic point is that the Coordina-
tor’s duties are modeled on the formal legal process. The next section describes how Title 
IX Coordinators between 2011 and 2014 evidenced adherence and departure from the for-
mal archetype. 
V. ADHERENCE TO AND DEPARTURE FROM THE ARCHETYPE 
Title IX Coordinators adhering to the archetype use a formal process in which they 
enforce mandatory reporting requirements and compel certain individuals’ participation, 
conduct at least an initial investigation of every complaint, and issue an investigative re-
port. Coordinators adhering to the archetype are consistent in their policy for providing 
notice to respondents and for ensuring appropriate hearing protocols are followed. These 
departures from the archetypal model often do not meet standards of legal compliance or 
risk exposing the university community to further sexual misconduct. Title IX Coordina-
tors who adhere or depart from the archetype do so along a spectrum from complete ad-
herence to complete departure. 
A. Enforcement of Mandatory Reporting and Participation Requirements 
1. Adherence 
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype enforce mandatory reporting re-
quirements to notify the Title IX office of any suspected sexual improprieties. For exam-
ple, a Coordinator described mandatory reporters as “[a]nybody with any information [in-
cluding an Ombuds], on anything associated with discrimination [or] sexual misconduct 
[or required by law] it’s required that they report it.”195 Title IX Coordinators described 
these reporting requirements as necessary for an effective institutional response: 
If [a complainant] start[s] at the police department, [the police] have a connection and work 
very closely with us to make sure we get the information we need once that person makes 
                                                          
 193. Office for Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on OCR’s Complaint Process, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/qa-complaints.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
 194. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1854 at 1-2. 
 195. T4A8:28-30 
23
Pappas: Dear Colleague: Title IX Coordinators and Inconsistent Compliance
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
PAPPAS_FINAL_11-30 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2016 11:16 AM 
144 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:121 
contact with them…[and the] dean of students does the same [for the police]. So we have a 
very good collaborative working relationship that all of us at some point will be notified of 
a concern so that we can all do what we need to do to resolve it.196 
There is an expectation that all complaints, even those made at other offices, will 
funnel to the Title IX Coordinator.197 Title IX Coordinators often expect even non-man-
datory reporters to encourage official reporting. For example: 
We’ve got a student counseling center where there are psychologists. One of the things they 
do is encourage them to bring it forward to my office for official processing so that . . . I 
don’t know what they tell them, but I assume they tell them [to] “protect other women as 
well.”198 
Multiple Title IX Coordinators, adhering to the archetype, described the complain-
ant’s participation in a hearing as voluntary: "[The Complainant and Respondent] have the 
opportunity to appear. It is not a requirement, but if [the complainant] doesn’t come, and 
we don’t have any other way of getting the evidence in, that case might fall apart." 199 
Survivors are never required to participate, but witnesses and other individuals may 
be compelled to provide information. Policies requiring participation are often used by 
Title IX Coordinators to gain cooperation, as indicated by a Coordinator: 
We have in our policy that failure to cooperate with an investigation can [result in] discipli-
nary action. And that is in there for people who either falsify information[or] flat out refuse 
to cooperate with an investigation . . . .So if someone [has] information, [and] I know they 
have information, [and] they refuse to cooperate or come in and don’t provide full coopera-
tion and I [can] prove [it], then you’re going to be disciplined for it. In other words . . . this 
is a responsibility. . . . to make sure the process works. So if you’re not going to be part of 
the process, then we’re going to have to deal with that.  I don’t want to have to deal with the 
discipline, I just want . . . you cooperating and giving me the information and giving me true 
and accurate information. Then you’re done. I’m giving you the word that no one is going 
to know what you told me until and unless it is subpoenaed. I rarely [have that happen as] . 
. . most attorneys . . . want to do their own depositions and everything. . . . We’re going to 
protect your information, but you’re going to give me that information. If you don’t give me 
the information, and you’re just refusing to do that, I’m going to discipline you because 
you’re not going to put a spoke in the wheel of this process.200 
Another Coordinator echoed, “if a person is named in any way in an investigation, 
yes, they are required to participate in the process . . .”201 Where an attorney advises their 
client not to share information, Coordinators do their best to gain their cooperation. Coor-
dinators adhering to the archetype do not need to allow attorneys to be present for inter-
views as long as the policy is consistent for both respondent and complainant. Thus, “. . . 
the attorney was basically told ‘this person either cooperates in the investigation or I go 
                                                          
 196.  T13A10:12-18 
 197. E.g., “[The Ombuds Office] pretty consistently will refer any complaints that they get that are about 
discrimination or harassment to us.”  T3A7:20-21 
 198. T12A6:8-11 
 199. T9A12:31-35 
 200. T10A12:1-22. 
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on the basis of what I have. My advice is allow your client to talk to me. Oh, by the way, 
you’re not entitled to be in the interview.’”202 
2. Departure 
Title IX Coordinators frequently depart from the archetype’s formality by relaxing 
the formality of reporting requirements. Specifically, departure occurs when Coordinators 
do not ask for specific information about a complaint, do not require other offices to have 
the Title IX Coordinator’s permission before handling complaints, or do not have or en-
force a policy requiring others to report incidents. For example, one Coordinator described 
their relationship with the Ombuds by saying, “I think it’s a close relationship and [the 
Ombuds] will call and say ‘can I run something by you without any identifying infor-
mation,’ and then they’ll go back to their visitors and share information.”203 
Another Coordinator likewise indicated a less stringent reporting arrangement with 
informal offices: 
[Other offices] may not have the teeth that we have, but it’s critical for students to have that 
first place to go. Students don’t sign up to be infused in the formalized process of a grievance 
structure, that’s not why they’re here. They’re here to study and to learn and to have the 
greatest four years of their life, so it’s important to have those touch points that can redirect 
them if they need to be redirected.204 
Coordinators also depart from the archetype by not documenting visitors’ state-
ments: 
We have a complaint form, but . . . I am loathe to require that they complete it until we talk. 
And . . . I’m also loathe to tape record, because it changes the tenor of a meeting when you 
put that thing between the two of you, and [on that point] the general counsel and I [disa-
gree].205 
In sum, while many Title IX Coordinators enforce mandatory reporting require-
ments, others depart from the archetype by relaxing the requirements relating to reporting. 
B. Consistent Practice of Providing Notice to Respondents & Explaining Process to 
Both Sides 
1. Adherence 
Title IX Coordinators adhering to the archetype use clearly defined formal processes 
to allow survivors and alleged perpetrators to know what to expect. 
The more formal the more you have a very, very clearly defined investigative process, the 
more you’ve figured out exactly what your intro to anybody you meet with is about confi-
dentiality, outcomes, what you will be able to share, what you won’t, the more you set all 
that up and have frankly a very legally sound final written report on the back end, the more 
I think people at least know what to expect when they come to your office and that it’s not 
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going to be all over the board. I do think, so in that sense having a very clearly defined formal 
process resulting in a formal report at the end does set you up for less legal challenges, less 
procedural challenges, etc., on the back end. Which, frankly, all goes to your reputation of 
the office on the campus. It all comes back to that.206 
The Coordinator continued: 
If we’re interviewing the complainant at that point we let them basically tell their story, but 
we make sure it’s done in the context of they have full notice of what to expect, because it 
is true that once we know who the respondent is and what happened, we’re going to have to 
move forward. . . I think [notice is] very critical to being fair to the complainant who often 
doesn’t want to tell their story, doesn’t want to be brought into a length[y] process, so we 
make sure they know what they’re getting into before they talk to us. I actually think it goes 
to our credibility on campus. It would be hard to do this job if you didn’t… I think that’s 
what builds the trust.207 
This is echoed by another Title IX Coordinator: 
[W]e’ve got a checklist that we use that covers all of this, and that checklist, we go through 
the process with them, we make sure that they understand that if it is a sexual assault or a 
rape that they have the option to pursue both the administrative process and the criminal 
process. We explain to them the difference, which is a big thing. I think that’s probably been 
the biggest area that we’ve made some difference in terms of the educational knowledge of 
our students and faculty, but if you’re raped you can, there is a university process that can 
do things on campus that the police, the criminal prosecution can’t do. . . . [W]e tell them 
the names of all the resources that there are [available, including counseling]. . . . We talk to 
them about our complaint resolution process, what it looks like. Make sure that they under-
stand what their rights are. . . . We have a [similar] checklist that we go through with the 
respondent.208 
Coordinators who follow the archetype always provide notice to the respondent after 
receiving the initial complaint. The following Coordinators described a norm of talking to 
the respondent within a few days of receiving the complaint: 
Usually [I discuss the situation with the respondent] within the first few days of getting the 
complaint in.  [I’m not gathering information ahead of that] . . . what we typically do is we 
talk to the complainant and respondent first, we give them both the opportunity to get what-
ever documentary evidence they think we should look at, and we also tell them “please let 
us know what other witnesses we need to talk to.”209 
Some Coordinators even go line by line through the complaint with the Respondent: 
Once we get [confirmation that the written complaint we sent is correct] back [from the 
complainant] we talk with the alleged offender and we go through the same thing. “Here’s 
my name, this is what we do, we’ve received a complaint.” We usually send it to them in 
writing, they make an appointment to come see us. And then we talk about it. “Here’s what 
we have, let’s go point by point,” and we get their response. If they respond in a way with 
evidence [that indicates] “yeah, I said it," . . . That ends the investigation. If they’re defending 
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it and we need to have more information to determine whether or not it’s more reasonable or 
not to think the probably did it or didn’t do it, we then ask them for witnesses to talk with 
and then we have our witness list.210 
Coordinators described the reasons for treating the complainant and respondent 
equally: 
[[Respondents] want to have their day and they want to be heard and you’ve got to treat them 
respectfully, you can’t just go in the door and say “you did this,” no, you’ve got to give 
people the respect and listen to them and work through that.211 
 
I think that respondents deserve the same kind of, I think it helps keep everybody safer if we 
were able to give notice to a respondent or share the outcome in the same way we do with a 
complainant.212 
 
Another Coordinator described waiting to provide notice: 
[Respondents] often feel ambushed, and sometimes we do ambush them because we fre-
quently ask questions that we already know the answers to and how they answer the question 
is important. We may already know the facts, but they don’t know that we know that, so 
when we confront them with conflicting information they get pissed off because we am-
bushed them, . . . in many instances, . . . people who are not accustomed to having their 
authority challenged.213 
The impact of this tactic is further described by the same Coordinator: 
Well, people file complaints on us. They allege that they were mistreated in the investigation. 
They allege that we were biased. They allege that we spoke to them harshly. They allege that 
we harassed them, all kinds of things. . . . And then sometimes, short of that, they’ll complain 
to our bosses that an investigation was unfair or that we individually spoke to them harshly 
or something was unfair . . . [b]ecause we ask them questions that make them uncomforta-
ble.214 
Coordinators described needing the complainant to make a direct report in order to 
appropriately provide respondents with notice, as indicated by a Coordinator who ob-
served: 
It saves a step. If I get [a complaint] through a third person I have to go back to the [alleged 
victim] and say “we got this complaint, talk to me.” We have to then make them comfortable 
to do that before I can even get out the gate to go and talk to the alleged offender.  When we 
don’t do it that way and you put yourself in this predicament [where I am calling a respondent 
to say] “you know what, we got a complaint by somebody” [and they will respond] “Oh 
really, who?” [and all I can say is] “I can’t really tell you that right now.” [They will want to 
know] “Well, what did they say I did?” [Respondents] don’t have to answer any questions 
because I’m basically violating your due process [rights]..215 
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Coordinators providing notice frequently select the timing of that notice on a case-
by-case basis. For example, a Coordinator described typically interviewing the respondent 
immediately after the complainant: 
So I usually, not always, but usually interview the alleged harasser or discriminator next. 
Give them a copy of the policy, explain to them that we are impartial and have not reached 
any conclusions, but this person has come forward and made a complaint about you. We 
want to get your side of the story. I try not to give away too much at first because I really 
would like to hear what they had to say before I drill down to the nuts and bolts of “here’s 
what she said you did.” I get there eventually, but I start with “tell me how it is you came to 
know X. What happened on such and such or when you all were at such and such restaurant 
or this event” or something like that and get them to sort of ramble.216 
2. Departure 
Alternatively, many Coordinators depart in the other direction by failing to consist-
ently provide notice to respondents in an effort to gain better information and serve organ-
izational interests in compliance. For example: 
We typically start with the complainant. Then we allow that person to tell their story, identify 
any evidence and witnesses. We will then interview their witnesses. . . . And then we’ll go 
through the same process with the respondent.217 
Coordinators also described ambushing respondents by speaking with the respond-
ent last: 
[Respondents] often feel ambushed, and sometimes we do ambush them because we fre-
quently ask questions that we already know the answers to and how they answer the question 
is important. We may already know the facts, but they don’t know that we know that, so 
when we confront them with conflicting information they get pissed off because we am-
bushed them, . . . in many instances, . . . people who are not accustomed to having their 
authority challenged.218 
Other Coordinators described why and when they will not immediately notify the 
respondent: 
Sometimes, I will immediately notify the respondent that there is a complaint. Sometimes, I 
don’t immediately notify the respondent. Sometimes, I talk to some of the persons who may 
have witnessed what took place before I approach the respondent. We certainly won’t take 
any action until the respondent receives notification of the complaint. Sometimes, getting 
information from other witnesses helps to inform how we approach the respondent. So, and 
I know some investigators say we need to notify the respondent early on in this process, let 
them know that they have a complaint, and then we start talking to the witnesses. I do that 
sometimes, sometimes I don’t. Because sometimes gathering that information helps me in 
terms of how I approach the respondent to get some truthful answers . . . . If I have enough 
information then maybe I can know what questions to ask to make sure I get the right, the 
truthful response.219 
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As a result, often Coordinators relax their commitment to formality in order to en-
courage people to share information and cooperate. For example: 
Often they [give] us . . . resistance at first, but through careful conversation with them and 
offering the resources we have on campus and trying to work with them . . . one of the first 
conversations we have is “what outcome are you looking for? What do you want to see 
happen here?” So that they get to play a role and have some control about how we proceed. 
It’s through that gentle process that we often can [convince them to] go forward. I don’t think 
it’s because the students have heard of [our reputation], I think it’s more that we sort of have 
to coax them along.220 
In sum, Title IX Coordinators were frequently observed to depart from the archetype 
by failing to consistently provide notice to respondents. 
C. Initially Investigate Every Complaint, Ensure Documentation, Issue an 
Investigative Report 
1. Adherence 
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype use a police/prosecutor model in 
which every complaint, without exception, must receive an initial investigation to deter-
mine if further steps are needed. This initial investigation begins within the initial inter-
view as Coordinators question the complainants to determine whether further action is 
needed. For example: 
Then if [the visitor] starts to ramble I will then say “let’s get back on track, why are you 
here? What happened to make you come here.” And then they will explain “well, I was not 
selected to go to a conference that I’ve always gone to, and this person, I heard it was because 
of the color of my skin or I believe it was.”[I will then ask]“okay, why do you believe it 
was?” And during that time I ask “give me specific evidence that it is on the basis of your 
race, or give me specific evidence that you’re being sexually harassed.” We really try to 
make sure we’re in the world of [compliance]. As a result of that, either I can tell right then 
or there or the person will admit “I really don’t think it’s discrimination, I’m just not being 
treated well.” Then we know it’s not the [compliance] world. If they say “it’s because my 
counterpart is a white female, she did the same thing I did, but she’s being treated better, she 
was being treated better in this regard, this regard, this regard” then we could say “it looks 
like there’s enough to at least do an investigation to prove or not prove your case.” Then I 
explain to them the investigation process.221 
In most instances observed in this study, the investigation culminates with Title IX 
Coordinators’ reports. The reports include a recommendation regarding guilt and also po-
tential sanctions. In some situations, the report goes to a panel or to an administrator who 
makes the ultimate determination regarding guilt and sanctions. As one Coordinator de-
scribed this process, “. . . [A] final report is drafted for my review or for my boss’s review 
if I’m doing the investigation, and then recommendations are sent out with the find-
ings.”222 
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In other situations, the Title IX Coordinator’s report determines whether there is a 
Title IX violation, and a panel or administrator determines the appropriate sanctions. A 
Coordinator described that situation, “for students, the hearing board determines [punish-
ment]. . . . Again, it’s all about consistency. We just want to make sure for certain viola-
tions we’re consistent in terms of how we implement those.”223 
Alternatively, the Title IX Coordinator’s report serves as an indictment, stating prob-
able cause to proceed with charges, with the case then proceeding to a more formal hear-
ing. For example: 
. . . [S]o what we wind up doing is writing a summary of the investigation and providing 
findings of fact to the student conduct office with a recommendation, and it’s only a recom-
mendation, as to whether further proceedings are warranted or not.  And then that office 
decides whether they will engage their disciplinary proceedings or not. But we do an initial 
set of findings, of fact, without a conclusion as to whether a policy has been violated or not.  
[We become the investigative arm of the student conduct office] but we work together be-
cause we basically attend the same interviews and we produce a memo. They’re actually free 
to disregard it, but that doesn’t usually happen.224 
2. Departure 
Many coordinators use informal mechanisms in order to serve organizational inter-
ests in preventing litigation. Such approaches contravene the requirements of investigat-
ing, documenting, and reporting. One Coordinator, for example, stated “what I do is not 
advocate, I look at the interests of the university as a whole, so we want to get issues 
resolved, taken care of, redressed at the lowest level possible.”225 Another, describing a 
change in university policy regarding Title IX, echoed: 
I had previously been advised not to go near that by [the general counsel’s] office. We had 
a change of president here who didn’t like all the investigative reports we were turning out 
because whenever we had findings of discrimination or sexual harassment, those reports, 
they always become attachment A to the lawsuit against the institution. Now I’ve been given 
the green light to sort of identify cases that maybe can reach an informal resolution without 
having to go through a full investigation. Now that informal resolution sometimes also means 
can we bump somebody out of the institution on the base of which you already know without 
having to go through a full investigation. That’s usually what that means, because we’re not 
looking to coerce anybody, [but just] give them an opportunity to resign.226 
S/he continued: 
Especially if we discover early on that there is serious evidence of serious misconduct, [the 
administration] may not want us to go to a full report because maybe they’re going to nego-
tiate a departure of somebody, and it will not be necessary to produce a full blown report. 
That happens and that’s why it’s necessary to be in touch with supervisors and the like.227 
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Many Coordinators described examples of their use of informal mechanisms. In one 
situation, an apology was unsuccessful but was seen as a means of resolving the issue: 
[And now the instructor became] determined that he was also going to sue [the] students for 
defamation of character.  [Everyone] got lawyers.  All of this could have been avoided had 
he said “I’m Sorry,” [but I couldn’t make that happen].228 
In addition to using informal mechanisms, Coordinators described not utilizing for-
mal process tools such as an intake form or recording the conversation, to the dismay of 
the general counsel: 
We have a complaint form, but . . . I am loathe to require that they complete it until we talk. 
And . . .  I’m also loathe to tape record, because it changes the tenor of a meeting when you 
put that thing between the two of you, and[on that point] the general counsel and I [disa-
gree].229 
The same Coordinator described why it is important not to require the complainant 
to complete an intake form: 
I was trained differently. If you have a potential victim, you don’t know their state. You 
make the process as easy for them as you can without cheating. Still, I do it for the other side 
too. I interviewed the young man or whoever it is, I take notes, we assume that they’re telling 
the truth until we hear otherwise. The same kind of thing. I just was not trained that way. . .  
People like doing that. They really enjoy the process and it’s very cathartic for them and all 
that. Or they’re just sort of Type A kind of people who like that sort of [formality, they] want 
this to be [an] official thing. That’s fine! But we don’t ever require it.230 
Coordinators also depart from the archetype to avoid the formal requirement of in-
vestigating and reporting within sixty days. For example, a Coordinator expressed “some-
times the handling of some [cases] takes longer than others, so you try to handle them 
within 60 days or less, and I don’t look at the 60 days, I just want to handle them.”231 
Many Coordinators indicated an incorrect understanding of the time limitations to com-
plete an investigation and issue findings:  “[W]e allow ourselves now 120 days to complete 
all of this. So it’s 90 days for the investigation, 30 days for the report.”232 
Title IX Coordinators who conform to the archetype use a formal investigative pro-
cedure that begins with mandatory reporting, continues with formal investigative tech-
niques that mirror those of police and prosecutor, and concludes with an investigative re-
port that is similar to an indictment (along with recommendations for resolution of the 
complaint). Title IX Coordinators departing from the archetype prefer informal resolution, 
and relax the investigative procedures. 
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D. Maintain the Role’s Impartiality 
1. Adherence 
If the Title IX Coordinator does conduct the investigation, OCR requires taking steps 
to guard against a conflict of interest in this role.233 Specific examples of a conflict of 
interests include where the Title IX Coordinator is also the Athletic Director, Dean of Stu-
dents, or “serves on the judicial/hearing board or to whom an appeal might be made.”234 
This conflict of interest definition suggests that Title IX does not bar the Coordinator from 
making the initial determination of guilt or innocence, as long as they do not oversee the 
appeal. In many instances observed in this study, the Title IX Coordinator does not per-
sonally investigate, but it is done by a staff member in the Title IX compliance or other 
office in order to provide some separation between the investigative and adjudicatory func-
tions. 
Title IX Coordinators who follow the archetypal model do, however, advocate for 
the goals of law and policy: 
So we try to blend this sense of reasonableness, some sense of advocacy for right, for the 
policy, with protection and due process for the alleged perpetrator, [the] alleged defender. 
You have to have all that in front of you in making a decision. That’s why I say it’s not a 
pure advocacy role, because a pure advocacy role is different. And that’s not what we do. 
We have that at the university, [but] that’s not my role.235 
Often Title IX Coordinators following the archetypal model must navigate others’ 
differing assumptions about their role: 
[There is an] immediate conclusion that [the process is] going to be a heavy-handed, legal-
istic process and that all [I am] interested in [doing] is protecting the university . . . and so 
people don’t have a lot of trust coming into [the] process. This may be the first time they’ve 
had this experience, they’ve never had to visit [my] office before or have reason to enquire 
about [my] office. Then they find out [I am] a lawyer and that adds a dimension to it “oh my 
gosh . . .” I think it’s also the culture of an office and the culture [that I] try to create is to 
reassure both parties and witnesses that [I am] objective and [I am] not pre-judging, and that 
takes a lot of work to get people to understand.236 
Another Coordinator noted: 
I think some people perceive us as being an arm of the regent or an arm of the administration, 
and I don’t think that’s a fair perception at all. I think we are [here] to promote and enforce 
Title IX on the campus, but I think some people see us as we’re just keeping the campus safe 
from lawsuits.237 
Coordinators who adhere to the archetype see their office as an impartial mechanism 
for investigating and preventing sexual misconduct, not necessarily to provide options or 
maintain confidential communications. For example, a Coordinator says he tells visitors: 
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I do an investigation based upon the information you give me. My role is not to talk and give 
you options.  Unless there is nothing in your conversation to suggest that you’re being sub-
jected to discrimination, and it is just bad behavior that you don’t like and it doesn’t rise to 
the level of protected activity, of course I won’t do anything. But, for students who come in 
and say “I’ve been sexually harassed in the last month, but I don’t want you to say anything,” 
I stop them and say “I can’t. This isn’t the place for you.”238 
Title IX Coordinators following the archetype did indicate communicating with uni-
versity counsel and administrators about complaints: 
I work really closely with university counsel. We pretty much review all our final reports 
with them. They’re aware of all of our cases, obviously, because it could have liability im-
plications for the university, but I don’t ever feel like they’re trying to impose upon us any 
sort of outcome.239 
2. Departure 
Title IX Coordinators departing from the archetype indicate a partiality for one side 
or the other, and described institutional norms that damaged the impartiality of Title IX 
efforts. For example, 
I’m not handling informal . . . people who come to me and they don’t want me to go for the 
jugular, so to speak, I don’t deal with them as much. . . . I try to tell them “Ombuds is the 
soft touch, they’ll try to communicate and mediate and work it out, but when you come to 
me, that means you want the hammer on the nail.”240 
Another Coordinator echoed the sentiment by saying, “I’m trying to get them to 
understand the seriousness [of their offense]. I really don’t try to nail people to the wall 
unless they really are being jerks about it.”241 
One Coordinator noted “end[ing] up in more of an advocacy role than I should be” 
by “help[ing] [the parents] make an appointments [to gather medical evidence]  . . I rec-
ommended a local psychologist and I did some things that probably were advocacy, but  
what do you do when they’re in your office and everybody’s weeping and dad’s ready to 
punch someone out and put a hole in the wall?”242 
Other Coordinators expressed frustration at what they saw as efforts to avoid insti-
tutional liability in ways that benefited the alleged perpetrator. For example: 
[T]he point that was also negative and very frustrating to me was that this student conduct 
board makes a recommendation to [the vice president], who issues a decision. Then that 
decision can be appealed by either party to the president. So what happened was . . .  the 
[VP] took twenty days to review it [and we were mid semester].  I believe he was dragging 
his feet on purpose to let the [respondent] finish the semester. Close to the end of the semester 
he concurred with the panel, [and then there is an appeal to the president].  The president 
went on a vacation, and did not leave it with somebody else to handle. So this guy got to 
finish the semester, go back home to another state and enroll in another university without 
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ever having a record on his transcript that he had any issues.  It was too late to notify them. 
He was already in another place and taking classes when [the] decision [was made]. . . When 
we asked the registrar [if we can inform the other school] she aid she didn't know.  When 
they took him he was a student in good standing. I honestly believe that the VP and president 
conspired to kill time to allow him to do that. I really do. Because the students only have [so 
many] days from an event to file a student conduct report, but that vice president took twenty 
days to make a decision. Is that fair?243 
Coordinators who depart from the archetype often assume multiple roles in the in-
vestigative and adjudicative process. One Coordinator expressed concern about acting as 
a witness in hearings: “. . . how am I supposed to be fair and thorough and impartial when 
I’m called by one side and not another [to testify]. . . . I feel funny about that.”244 Another 
Coordinator described playing a role past the investigation and recommendation phase, 
“[after the recommendation] [w]e become witnesses at the student conduct hearing. . . .  
I've testified at our conduct hearing, but I haven't been cross-examined by anyone.”245 
Coordinators also described hearing about Title IX Coordinators holding a dual role in the 
legal counsel’s office.246 
In sum, Title IX Coordinators often struggle to maintain the impartiality of the role 
by assuming multiple roles in the process, and by advocating for individuals instead of 
correct application of law and policy. 
E. Utilize the Correct Standard of Proof 
1. Adherence 
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype use the correct “preponderance 
of the evidence” standard of proof, not the more stringent “beyond a reasonable doubt” or 
“clear and convincing” standards. Title IX Coordinators described attempting to educate 
campus members regarding the correct standard. Thus, 
I deal with a lot of deans and they try to tell me what the law is all the time, and how I need 
to do my investigations all the time, and I always have to bring them back to “everything 
you see on TV on Law and Order and on CSI, I get that, but that’s a criminal investigation, 
and that’s not what we’re doing here. It’s a civil rights or civil investigation, and using the 
word civil means that we’re going to build relationships and we’re going to be civil to each 
other and figure out what happened. I am not trying to nail anybody to the wall, I’m not 
calling the police unless I uncover some criminal activity, but we need to look at this a little 
bit different.” I don’t use proof beyond a reasonable doubt, I’m about preponderance of ev-
idence. Now [on] the faculty side, they want me to use clear and convincing, which I refuse 
to do because for me, clear and convincing weights it in the professor’s favor. It’s not a 
balance.247 
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2. Departure 
Other Coordinators do not seem to understand or ensure the use of the proper legal 
standard for guilt. For example, a Coordinator described a hearing in which the wrong 
standard was used: 
The investigat[ion] found that the policy was violated more likely than not, [and] recom-
mended a hearing. . . . [A]n adjudicator [is appointed], . . . the victim’s very anxious, does 
not want to go forward, does not like the process, just wants it to be over, feels the process 
is being drawn out . . . and in the end the adjudicator finds the respondent not responsible. . 
. . The adjudicator failed to understand the [appropriate] standard.248 
Title IX Coordinators adhering to the archetype use a formal process in which they 
enforce mandatory reporting requirements and compel certain individuals’ participation, 
conduct at least an initial investigation of every complaint, and issue an investigative re-
port. Title IX Coordinators who depart from the archetype use or prefer more informal 
mechanisms for resolving sexual misconduct. They relax the standards of the formal role 
in ways that endanger the community and expose the institution to legal risk. The next 
section describes four explanations motivating non-compliance. 
VI. THREE EXPLANATIONS MOTIVATING NON-COMPLIANCE  
Title IX Coordinators are tasked with effectuating Title IX compliance to ensure a 
safe campus while protecting the rights of survivors and alleged perpetrators. From an 
outside perspective, this seems to be a straight-line exercise in managing a formal investi-
gation process and educating the campus to understand the rules. In reality, compliance 
with Title IX, as evidenced by interviews with Title IX Coordinators between 2011 and 
2014, is inconsistent at best. Departures from the archetype occur primarily to address the 
needs of survivors or alleged perpetrators, out of frustration with the inefficiencies of ex-
cessive formalism, and to address the organization’s interest in resolving disputes and 
avoiding liability. Overall, the picture of university Title IX compliance is one motivated 
more by symbolic enforcement. Each of these motivating factors is now described in turn. 
A. To Create Substantive Justice for Individuals 
Theories of street-level bureaucracy specifically focus on how individuals on the 
front lines of administration play active roles in this process of bureaucratic politics, and 
how their discretionary decisions shape the enforcement of rules and laws.249 As 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno note, “street-level work is ambiguous and marked by con-
flicting signs, leaving the worker to determine how to respond.”250 As illustrated by the 
below examples, “the needs and character of [the individuals served] (as defined by the 
[Title IX Coordinator]) and the demands of rules, procedures, and policies (as understood 
by the [Title IX Coordinator]) exist in unresolveable tension.”251 
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How Title IX Coordinators respond to a need to produce substantive justice may be 
best understood through the lens of street-level bureaucracy theory. This theory posits that 
individuals on the front lines of administration vary in the extent to which they enforce the 
rules and laws assigned to them, and that they do so specifically in order to produce out-
comes in individual cases that seem to them more just and appropriate than the outcome 
demanded by strict application of the rules.252 Title IX Coordinators must navigate the 
unresolveable tension between the demands of rules, procedures, and policies and the 
needs and character of the individuals served. In navigating these tensions, they sometimes 
depart from the strict requirement of the rules so as to protect a vulnerable individual from 
further harm, or to protect other people from harm by a serial abuser. Sometimes, at least 
in the view of Title IX Coordinators, the goal of producing justice seems to require depar-
ture from the rules. 
1. Prosecutorial Discretion 
First, very much like a street-level bureaucrat, Coordinators noted having discretion, 
much like a prosecutor, and engaging in informal conversations that contravene the re-
quirements of the formal role. For example: 
There are times, depending on the facts they provide, because clearly, if this is something 
that smells like sexual harassment, we’re going to investigate, but if it’s feeling like “well, 
someone is telling some off-color jokes, they seem to be targeting, they’re just kind of that 
equal-opportunity tell a bad joke” . . . . And it’s one of those situations like that, then we can 
either talk with the supervisor, we can say “you know what, we’ve caught wind of . . .  you 
need to get that person under control.” I don’t have to tell them a name. And there are times 
when I will say “I’m not going to share the name with you at this point, I don’t think that’s 
as important as it is you stepping in and dealing with what’s going on here.” Then I’ll ask 
“are you aware of this?” Some will say “I wasn’t aware of this, but I’ll take care of it.”253 
Another Coordinator described the discretion to avoid formal processes: 
A lot of times we’ll work [with] a complainant to say “your case is right on the line.” Some 
are so egregious that we have to do a formal [investigation], but there are a lot of cases that 
are kind of right in the middle and then we’ll try to give the complainant some say. “Do you 
want to go through the formal process which is going to be lengthy and difficult or would 
you just as soon try to solve this informally, which will be much more quickly handled, but 
it’s not likely going to result in a policy violation?”254 
2. Individualized Justice 
Second, Title IX Coordinators who do not follow the archetype do so out of a desire 
to serve and address the needs of survivors or alleged perpetrators. Often that means giving 
priority to providing voice to visitors over learning relevant information about misconduct. 
Coordinators often described feeling very moved by individuals’ stories: 
But usually my first meeting is lots of real thick wrinkles right above my eyebrows because 
I do a lot of empathetic looking and face-making. I don’t mean that I don’t feel, I do feel, 
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but I just try to let them feel safe and secure in telling their story and I listen and write and 
ask questions where I feel I need to. Then when they sort of wind down and I’m not good at 
letting people stop, keeping people brief. I’m very not good at that at all. I believe they need 
to get it out.255 
Another Coordinator noted the same phenomenon: 
I am the complaint department. People hear that I’m here or what I do, what they think I do, 
and they immediately say “oh, I’ve got a problem, I need to go talk to her.” So I try to explain 
to them “my job is to ensure that your rights haven’t been trampled on, understand what it is 
you want out of your complaint, and/or direct you to the right person to hear your complaint.” 
Sometimes people come and talk to me and it has nothing to do with what I do.256 
Title IX Coordinators who depart from the archetype often described using informal 
means of resolution to help survivors. For example: 
[I]f we’ve got an especially fragile complainant, let’s say, rather than proceeding through 
our formal, full investigative process, we might figure out a way to handle it informally. We 
have a couple of options in terms of handling it informally. Typically, . . . we sit down with 
the respondent; we explain how they’ve impacted the complainant; we hear their side of the 
story; but we’re not making findings; we’re really trying to educate the respondent on how 
their behavior was coming across and making sure they understand that the behavior has to 
stop.257 
Further, Some Title IX Coordinators depart from the archetype because they see the 
formal process as too confrontational and thus harmful to survivors. For example: 
You don’t know how it’s burdened my heart. I often see them right after, the day after. 
They’re traumatized. They cry. . . . They [are often] furious . . . Furious.  Said that everyone 
over there was incompetent, unfeeling . . . our process is so victim unfriendly.258 
The same Coordinator continued: 
[T]he part that makes [it] really difficult is that the . . . conduct hearing is very formal [and] 
the victim is expected to mount her own defense. She must call her own witnesses. She must 
question her own witnesses. She must answer questions from the panel. . . . It’s very prob-
lematic, and I will tell you . . .  [the conduct panel gives the complainant] X number of days 
to get their documentation in while [a complainant may be] grieving over the loss of her 
virginity and feeling frightened for her physical safety and all these things are going on. The 
dad [is] trying to help get the paperwork together and gather the names of the witnesses and 
get witness statements. There’s all these requirements. . . . Here, we don’t even make you 
fill out a form. You come in, we take notes. . . . I struggled when you said positive outcome 
because there’s not a young woman that’s been through this process that has not said to me 
“the process was worse [than what happened to me].” It is re-victimization. The one that 
went [to the next step] said “I don’t want money, I just don’t want another girl to have to go 
through this.”259 
                                                          
 255. T12A7:22-28 
 256. T11A4:19-25 
 257. T1A10:9-19 
 258. T12B5:8-9; 7:32-33, 19-20 
 259. T12B3:8-11; 7:33-39; 3:39-43 
37
Pappas: Dear Colleague: Title IX Coordinators and Inconsistent Compliance
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
PAPPAS_FINAL_11-30 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2016 11:16 AM 
158 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:121 
Another Coordinator described using informal mechanisms to help alleged perpetra-
tors. One cited an example in which there was an investigation, evidence of clear miscon-
duct, but with an end result where “the [respondent] wrote a letter of apology and it was 
accepted.”260 The Coordinator continued: 
The [respondent] wanted to write the letter, so the alleged victim, if you will, the complainant 
agreed.  I think [the respondent understood] needing to do something. It was definitely need-
ing to do something. It was definitely needing to do something.  After all, there was this 
report somewhere about [the person], y'know?  [A realization that] “oh my gosh, I’ve got to 
do something to show that I’m not like this by any stretch of the imagination.”  [The same 
person] has actually come in and conducted a workshop [for us] because I recommended 
him . . . That occurred, but it didn't mean I was going to throw away the baby with the 
bathwater.261 
3. Excessive Formalism 
Third, many Title IX Coordinators depart from the archetype due to what they see 
as excessive formalism. Many Coordinators described a preference for informal proce-
dures as better for the individuals involved. One Coordinator noted preferring situations 
where everyone wins: “I like win/win. I just do. I prefer win/win situations. I think there 
always should be dignity in the process.”262 Coordinators often expressed strong dissatis-
faction with the formal process. For example,  “when they first come [in], I just dread it. 
Because I know [the formal process is] coming. I just think ‘oh my God, how can I do this 
to this person?’”263 Another Coordinator concurred: 
I think once you’re into a process such as a Title IX process, it’s so formal at that particular 
point, and the requirements are so different that it’s hard to maintain that sense of safety and 
security of why you came to university. . . . I really try to make it as non-intrusive as I can 
when we’re doing complaints with students. That’s not what they really signed up for, so we 
try to get through them quicker than the employees, let’s get in there, let’s find out the facts 
and get out so that they can finish their studies.264 
Nowhere is frustration with excessive formalism more evident than in growing lim-
its on the Title IX Coordinator’s authority to make judgments and recommendations. In 
order to more clearly separate the investigation and adjudication functions, many univer-
sities now prohibit Coordinators from making recommendations about or determining 
whether or not there was a violation of university policy. Coordinators expressed frustra-
tion at this lack of authority and the requirement of additional formal hearings. For exam-
ple: 
[W]hat we used to do, and we still do with employees, is that this office had the authority to 
make the decision about whether or not the policy had been violated. In the wake of the Dear 
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Colleague letter, our attorneys had decided that we can’t make that decision [or even a rec-
ommendation]. We can only decide if it’s worthy of a hearing. . . . [I]t’s insulting. . . . [It 
goes] in front of a hearing panel [of students and faculty], who ironically can’t serve on those 
panels until they’ve had two hours of training on Title IX from me, [and I’ve had] . . . years 
of training.265 
As a result, many Coordinators use less formal processes than what is required by 
Title IX out of frustration with what they see as excessive formalism. For example, a Co-
ordinator noted: 
I’ve had a real trouble dovetailing my process with the [formal office] because they are very 
rigid, very process-driven, to the point of dotting the I’s and crossing the T’s. . . . You know 
what I’m saying? And it’s primarily staff with young, ambitious professionals who are really 
more interested in making a name for themselves [than in] cur[ing] students, in my personal 
opinion.266 
Overall Title IX Coordinators act as street level bureaucrats by utilizing their discre-
tion to provide individualized justice in the name of avoiding what they see as excessive 
formalism. 
B. To Establish Professional Worth by Protecting the Institution from Unwanted 
Publicity 
A second reason for departure from the archetype is that Title IX Coordinators seek 
to establish professional worth with the institution. As indicated above, this often comes 
at the expense of the best interests of students.267 Dobbin’s book, Inventing Equal Oppor-
tunity, illustrates how personnel administrators used demands for equal opportunity to ex-
pand the reach and influence of their professions.268 With liability and the legal require-
ments of Title IX acting as the driving force, Title IX Coordinators must navigate the often 
conflicting interests expressed by university legal counsel, administrators, students, and 
activists. For example: 
Every time anybody says anything that just is remotely connected to some sort of Title IX 
issue, [administrators had] all read the Dear Colleague letter, but they didn't really know 
what we were doing before. . . . [and] it just put everyone in a tizzy and it’s sort of been 
interesting politically because  . . . you can feel a political tug there where they really want 
to be in charge of it. Kind of . . . because it’s a new and scary frontier and that’s a career 
maker if you’re 35[years old] and have your PhD and you’re looking to move up in the 
organization . . . . they call me about the slightest thing that any young woman says.  Any 
little thing, "We just thought we should refer this [to] you."269 
Many Title IX Coordinators described early settlement options as beneficial to the 
organization: “[Our process] has a remediation piece built into it as well, so that prior to 
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even going into the full-fledged investigation, there’s an opportunity to resolve it at a pre-
liminary stage.”270 Another Coordinator described a similar situation: 
So in the particular instance . . . [there was touching but] the [respondent] said “I may have 
done that, but I in no way intended it to mean that.” After questioning both parties, I saw 
where we could resolve the matter through mediation. The matter was very positively re-
solved, resulting in a beautiful card being sent to me by the alleged perpetrator.271 
Another Coordinator described reporting to the president and other administrators: 
“everything and anything that could be a potential embarrassment to the institution, that 
could be a headline tomorrow morning. I don’t want them being blindsided by anything. 
It’s what any good subordinate does for [their] boss.”272 Protecting the institution from 
liability is seen by many Coordinators as a way of establishing professional worth. 
One Coordinator described their efforts to get in front of students, but was told “sex-
ual violence and sexual harassment [are] too negative, [and you] [cannot] be part of . . . 
orientation because that would just scare people away.”273 Thus, a Coordinator described 
needing to act quickly to respond to pushback against implementing mandatory training: 
When you start seeing patterns and trends, you want to nip that crap in the bud and address 
it, so that it doesn’t become a volcano that just explodes all over everyplace. This campus 
was extremely reactive. When I suggested, as an example, that we do sexual harassment 
training for everyone, make it mandatory, including students, . . . I was told that “if we did 
that, that I would get more sexual harassment complaints. Why on earth would I want to do 
that?”274 
In many instances observed in this study, organizational interests in avoiding pub-
licity and a desire to develop professional worth drove Title IX Coordinators to depart 
from the archetype. 
C. Legal Endogeneity: Effectuating Managerial Solutions To Symbolize Compliance 
Title IX Coordinators depart from the archetype as a larger framework of symbolic 
efforts to evidence compliance that in reality do not achieve the underlying aims of the 
law. This is evidenced by Title IX Coordinators’ statements regarding the legalization of 
the process, by evidence that universities under Department of Education audit only tem-
porarily increase their reporting of sexual assault, and by the complicated maze of sexual 
misconduct policies and procedures. 
A third rationale for the departure from the archetype is the theory of legal endoge-
neity, or the process by which organizations define the parameters of legal compliance. 
Studies identify EEO/AA offices, similar to Title IX offices, as a sort of “non-law” struc-
ture that is meant to interpret and enforce law inside a bureaucratic organization.275 There 
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is a large amount of neo-institutional literature on how these “non-law” offices and pro-
cesses inside bureaucratic organizations develop.276 Recent scholarship has increasingly 
observed that organizational “responses” to external law so greatly shape what is meant 
by “compliance” that we should think of organizations as “constructing” their legal envi-
ronment.277 That is to say, courts have come to accept organizations’ internal EEO/AA 
policies and procedures as what the law requires.278 In this way institutionalized organi-
zational structure influences judicial views of compliance with the law.279 Effectively for-
mal organizational dispute systems create non-law mechanisms (grievance procedures, 
non-discrimination policies) of avoiding liability.280 In effect, the law is endogenously 
created by outside organizations the law is meant to regulate. 
Although these internal offices are a type of “non-law” alternative, observers have 
long noted that they come under pressure to mimic the formal processes of law.281 Alt-
hough Edelman has long argued that this mimicry is often akin to empty symbolism,282 
she has acknowledged that the managerial structures representing compliance often are 
quite legal (i.e. formal) in nature, and look superficially like legal institutions (policies and 
rules resemble legal rules, grievance procedures look like judicial proceedings, etc.). The 
more an organizational process mimics the formality of a legal process, the greater the 
likelihood that the process will receive deference and legitimacy by the courts.283 
In effect, a third rationale for the departure from the archetype is legal endogeneity, 
or the process by which organizations define the parameters of legal compliance, creating 
the structures and policies that evidence legal compliance but only mimic them and pref-
erence managerial interests over achieving the underlying aims of the law.284 This is evi-
denced first by the many Coordinators who spoke out about the excessive formalism of 
revised campus policies. 
Many Coordinators argued against the legalization, claiming it contravenes the un-
derlying aims of Title IX. For example: 
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General Counsel said that they have a due process right to an adjudicated hearing. Don’t 
know if that’s true or not.  In every other way and in every other situation, we are allowed to 
make decisions and recommendations. If they’re harassed by an employee, if they’re har-
assed by a third party, all of those scenarios, we conclude, we make decisions, we make 
recommendations for action. But it’s in this situation, and I think it’s a power thing. We went 
from a two page, non-discrimination policy for all protected groups for students to . . . we 
have drafted now a ten page . . . sexual harassment policy for students, and we’re carving 
that out of the non-harassment policy that’s more general for all the other protected classes. 
And it’s procedure and . . . the good part is it has definitions in it too, which are consistent 
with the Dear Colleague letter like consent, those kinds of things.  We have just legalized 
this thing to death, and it is not what OCR meant, in my opinion. . . . ATIXA just did a 
webinar and it says “recommendations: do not let the Title IX office make the decision. Put 
it in front of an adjudicator.” It's very problematic . . . .285 
Another Coordinator likewise expressed frustration at passing the liability around 
instead of addressing the real issues: 
I think [we are] passing the liability around. . . . [we are] doing an investigation, getting all 
of this information to do nothing with [it] but pass it on to someone else who is going to 
make the decision.  Ultimately I don’t know that it’s going to prevent anything.  Anybody 
who doesn’t agree with the outcome will just go to the person who did the investigation and 
say either it was flawed or the person making the recommendation was wrong.  So having 
one office that’s going to be on the hook for [an external complaint] for the investigation and 
[another for the] recommendation . . . I don't know how that  solves anything? . . . [They will 
say] “[o]kay, we’ll sue you both!”286 
Second, the symbolism of legal endogeneity is evidenced by complicated grievance 
procedures that are difficult for anyone to follow and understand, not to mention under-
graduates experiencing sexual misconduct or facing misconduct allegations. For example, 
the University of Kansas Sexual Harassment and Sexual Violence Policy287 is a document 
of over eight thousand words that links to a Student Non-Academic Conduct Procedures 
Policy of over five thousand words.288 The Michigan State University Policy on Relation-
ship Violence and Sexual Misconduct289 is nearly fourteen thousand words and contains 
nine appendixes.290 By comparison the Penn State University website describing Title IX 
Procedures is under two thousand words, but links to the Code of Conduct and Student 
Conduct Procedures291 document of nearly ten thousand words, nearly two thousand of 
which are devoted to sexual misconduct across multiple sections.292 Notably, the Penn 
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State provides for both a hearing and investigative model, contributing to a lack of clar-
ity.293 Complicated grievance policies may provide for certainty and predictability, but 
may be of little use to victims and alleged perpetrators when they are difficult to under-
stand and follow. 
 Third, the symbolism of legal endogeneity is evidenced by the high numbers of 
Office of Civil Rights investigations underway and evidence indicating widespread un-
derreporting. Grievance process and policy changes may demonstrate concern for remedi-
ating sexual misconduct, but ongoing investigations indicate they are not effective in stem-
ming the tide of investigation. Even five years past the release of the 2011 Dear Colleague 
Letter,294 and a sea change in policy, and process changes, The Chronicle for Higher Ed-
ucation still lists 279 open federal investigations.295 Recent empirical scholarship indi-
cates universities undercount incidents of sexual assault.296 According to University of 
Kansas Law Professor Corey Yung, universities only offer a more accurate portrayal of 
campus sexual assault during Department of Education audits.297 Yung also demonstrates 
that audits have “no long-term effect on the reported levels of sexual assault, as those crime 
rates returned to previous levels after an audit was completed.”298 With the lack of clarity 
surrounding Title IX compliance, and a culture of underreporting, students seeking a cam-
pus free from sexual hostility are wise to attend a university under investigation. Indeed, 
OCR guidance may be the best way for universities to ensure accurate reporting and gain 
the support and oversight necessary for attempting meaningful change. It remains to be 
seen the extent to which enforcement will wane under a Trump Administration. 
Departures from the legal archetype occur primarily to address the needs of survi-
vors or alleged perpetrators, out of frustration with the inefficiencies of excessive formal-
ism, and to address the organization’s interest in resolving disputes and avoiding liability. 
Overall, the picture of university Title IX compliance is one motivated more by symbolic 
enforcement than true dedication to ensure fair, equitable processes and a hostility-free 
campus. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Title IX Coordinators continue to struggle to comply with the competing goals of 
institutional efficiency and legal compliance, all while attempting to create a hostility-free 
educational environment. In the aftermath of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, compliance 
with Title IX remains, at best, inconsistent.299 Evidence indicates Title IX Coordinators 
between 2011 and 2014 did not consistently comply with requirements requiring manda-
tory reporting, did not consistently provide notice to respondents, and often departed from 
                                                          
 293. Id.  
 294. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4. 
 295. Title IX Sexual Assault Investigation Tracker, CHRONICLE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, available at 
http://projects.chronicle.com/titleix/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016) (listing 279 open federal investigations).  
 296. See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, Concealing Campus Sexual Assault: An Empirical Examination, 21 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1 (2015).  
 297. Id. at 1 (describing an increase in reports of sexual assault of approximately 44% during audit periods). 
 298. Id. at 5 (noting previous levels of reporting returned even in instances when fines were issued for non-
compliance).  
 299. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 4. 
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the investigation, documentation, and reporting requirements. These departures evidence 
a desire to achieve justice for individuals, to avoid the excessive formalism of renewed 
compliance efforts, and to establish professional worth by protecting the institution from 
negative publicity. With an ever increasing number of OCR investigations, and questions 
regarding the extent to which enforcement will wane under President Donald Trump, Title 
IX Compliance is far from an exact science. Fundamentally, there is evidence of symbolic 
legal endogeneity in which structures designed to achieve compliance are instead illusory 
and ineffective. 
Contrary to the image of managerial control over this internal institutionalization of 
law,300 Charles Epp suggests that under pressure from liability, bureaucratic organizations 
are often drawn far along the path toward legal formality.301 Epp’s theory of Legalized 
Accountability demonstrates how activists and administrators can use legal liability and 
the publicity generated by lawsuits to create innovative solutions and hold organizations 
accountable to the law.302 As a result, lawsuits become an enforcement mechanism that 
pressures organizational managers to adopt law-like policies and procedures that are more 
formalized and extensive than they initially preferred.303 
Instead of the empty symbolism of legal endogeneity, the story of campus sexual 
misconduct needs to be reframed to one of legalized accountability. In order to change the 
culture of campus sexual misconduct compliance, the first step is the continued profes-
sionalization of the Title IX compliance field. Title IX Coordinators interviewed often 
expressed ambivalence or negative perceptions of the Association for Title IX Adminis-
trators (ATIXA) as a professional association. One Coordinator stated: 
[T]here is a group called ATIXA, which I’m sure if you’ve done some research you’ve heard 
about that. There are really no requirements for anyone [to] be a certified Title IX coordina-
tor, and so I really haven’t bought into that program. Primarily I think I probably have as 
much experience as some of the people that are doing the certifying.304 
Much of this may be due to the fact that ATIXA was developed and exists as a 
project of the National Center for Higher Education Risk Management (NCHERM), cre-
ating the perception of a financial conflict of interests.305 NCHERM is a law and consult-
ing practice that provides consulting and risk management services for universities and 
colleges.306 NCHERM’s partners are all lawyers with significant experience in higher ed-
ucation, but not one has ever served as a Title IX Coordinator.307 Brett Sokolow holds a 
                                                          
 300. See Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance, supra note 7; Edelman, Legal Am-
biguity and Symbolic Structures, supra note 7; Edelman, When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Insti-
tutionalized Employment Structures, supra note 7.  
 301. CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE CREATION OF THE 
LEGALISTIC STATE 219 (2009).  
 302. See generally EPP, supra note 301.  
 303. Id. at 218-19.  
 304. T9A3:20-24 
 305. Welcome to The NCHERM Group, LLC, THE NCHERM GROUP, https://www.ncherm.org/ (last visited 
November 17, 2014). 
 306. Mission & Story, THE NCHERM GROUP, https://www.ncherm.org/ncherm/about/the-ncherm-story/ (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2016).  
 307. The NCHERM Group: Best Practices for Campus Health and Safety, THE NCHERM GROUP, 
https://www.ncherm.org/consultants/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).  
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dual role as the Executive Director of ATIXA and the President and CEO of NCHERM.308 
ATIXA provides model policies and guidance that are developed specifically by the mem-
bers of NCHERM, who are then available to provide consulting services to institutions of 
higher education.309 While ATIXA provides considerable practical advice to the Title IX 
compliance field, it would serve the Title IX Coordinator field well for Title IX Coordina-
tors to either make the association their own, or to create their own association. By taking 
an active role in the development of the field, Title IX professionals can work to avoid the 
inconsistent compliance with Title IX that characterizes the years following the 2011 Dear 
Colleague Letter. 
                                                          
 308. Brett A. Sokolow, J.D.: President & CEO, THE NCHERM GROUP, https://www.ncherm.org/consult-
ants/brett-sokolow/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).  
 309. On-Site Consultation: Workshops, THE NCHERM GROUP, https://www.ncherm.org/services/consulta-
tion/on-site-workshops/#CSM (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).  
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